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THE WHITE-COLLAR POLICE FORCE: "DUTY TO REPORT"
STATUTES IN CRIMINAL LAW THEORY
Sandra Guerra Thompson*
INTRODUCTION

The recent scandal within the American Catholic Church caused the
Massachusetts legislature to rush to consider amending the child abuse reporting
law in that state to include members of the clergy as "mandatory reporters" who
must report to the police any suspicions of child sexual abuse committed by any
person.' The Connecticut legislature - which has included members of the clergy
as mandatory reporters in their child sexual abuse reporting law for many years
is now considering removing the exception for statements made during confessions,
angering Catholics in the state. These latest reactions to the child abuse scandals
in the Catholic Church highlight the tendency legislators have shown to respond to
such crises by requiring people in certain professions to report suspicions of
criminality to the police. They have made the failure to report criminally
punishable and, in some instances, allow for civil liability as 'well. Besides
members of the clergy, other professionals such as educators, physicians, nurses,
optometrists, physical therapists, psychotherapists, and sometimes attorneys are
required to report their suspicions of child abuse.'
Child abuse, however, is only one example of the many reporting laws that exist
throughout our penal codes. At both the federal and state levels, numerous laws
require individuals to report suspicions of other types of criminal conduct, such as
elder abuse, violent crimes including domestic violence, environmental offenses,
and financial crimes.4 Reporting duties are imposed on people in many different
types of professions, depending on the type of offense.
In the financial industry, reporting duties were created primarily to deter money
laundering, but they require the reporting of any type of other financial offense as
Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. The author expresses her
gratitude to Susannah Biles (UHLC J.D. '03) for her excellent research assistance. The
author also acknowledges the generous support of the University of Houston Law
Foundation.
See Michael Paulson, 'Confession' in Sex Abuse Case A Bind For Clergy, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 30, 2001, at A l; Michael Paulson, Sex Abuse Reporting Measure Hits Snag,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7, 2002, at Al (House and Senate leaders in Massachusetts agree
*

reporting measure must exempt disclosures made during confessions).
2 See Carrie Budoff& Lisa Chedekel, Abuse MeasureAngers Catholics:Priests Would
Be ForcedTo Reveal Confessions, HARTFORD COURANT, May 8, 2002, at B 1.
.3 See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying
text.
' See infra notes 81-123, 124-66, 167-81 and accompanying text.
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well.5 In response to the attacks of September 11th, Congress has enacted new
provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act that will increase the level of regulation of the
financial industry.6 Whereas banks have had reporting duties for many years, the
USA PATRIOT Act adds many other types of "so-called 'financial institutions' to
the list of regulated entities.' The list now includes businesses dealing with
financial transactions, such as money transmitters, check-cashing companies, creditcard companies, and issuers of travelers' checks and money orders However, the
list of "financial institutions" also includes many other ordinary businesses that sell
goods to consumers, such as jewelers and automobile dealers.9 The regulations are
intended to require businesses to assist in the detection of terrorists who may
transact business in the United States. Businesses are required to keep various types
of records and to report suspicious activities to the federal agency responsible for

See infra notes 169-83 and accompanying text.
6 The Act is entitled the "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001" (USA PATRIOT Act of
2001), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 26 (2001).
Also, in response to the tragedy ofSeptember 11 th, the Justice Department is touting the
creation of a new security program named Terrorism Information and Prevention System
(TIPS). TIPS would establish a "workers corps" of utilities workers, truck drivers, port
workers, meter readers, bus drivers, telephone repair persons, and many others who would
be encouraged to report any suspicious activities they detect to the Justice Department. Adam
Clymer, Worker Corps to Be Formedto Report Odd Activity, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 26, 2002, at

A18. By means of this apparently voluntary program, the government would enlist
"thousands, even millions, of civilians" who would report "'anomalies,' like a truck parked
in a neighborhood doing surveillance work." Id. The plan has received criticism both from
conservative Republicans and from organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU). Majority leader Dick Armey and Congressman Bob Barr have led the attack by
conservative Republicans. Congressman Barr dubbed the program a "'snitch system,'saying
[that] '[a] formal program, organized, paid for and maintained by our own federal
government to recruit Americans to spy on fellow Americans, smacks of the very type of
fascist or Communist government we fought so hard to eradicate in other countries in decades
past."' Id. ACLU national director Laura W. Murphy also complained that "[t]his is a
program where people's activities, statements, posters in their windows or on their walls,
nationality, and religious practices will be reported by untrained individuals without any
relationship to criminal activity." Id. Although the proposal would not create a legal duty to
report suspicious activities, it is still noteworthy that the federal government would create a
vast, volunteer corps of workers who would be enlisted to keep a watchful eye on others. See
also David Crary, Vigilance, Paranoia:A Fine Line; No Easy Answersfor Terror Tipsters,
HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 17, 2002, at 1OA (both conservatives and liberals oppose operation
TIPS).
' Andres Rueda, InternationalMoney LaunderingLawEnforcement& the USA Patriot
Act of 2001, 10 MICH. ST. U.-DETRorrC.L. J. INT'LL. 141,150 (2001).
8 See id.
9 Id.
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tracking the financial dealings of criminal organizations."°
To protect the environment from catastrophic discharges of hazardous
substances, federal and some state laws also impose reporting duties on people in
charge of vessels or facilities should they detect a discharge of hazardous
substances. " In the case of such discharges, the duty to report requires a person to
contact the governmental agency responsible for responding to environmental spills.
As is sometimes true in the banking context, the report to the government may
expose the company that employs the reporter to civil liability for its role in causing
the harm that is reported. Thus, the environmental reporting laws are really what
one might call "self-reporting" laws. 2
This Article examines several types of reporting duties affecting numerous
types of professionals. The aim of the Article is to examine the trend to turn people
of many professions (and, increasingly, all people who may come upon
incriminating information) into a white-collar police force. The Article suggests
that reporting requirements are quietly and incrementally reshaping American
criminal law traditions. For example, the typical substantive criminal law course
in law school teaches students that common law countries do not punish for the
failure to be a "Good Samaritan," referring to the laws that punish the failure to
rescue a person in need of immediate assistance when such aid can be provided
without endangering the rescuer. Although the emotional appeal of creating a
mandatory duty to rescue is strong, we have resisted it in the majority of states and
at the federal level. 3 It is still fair to say that in this country the act of omission in
failing to come to the assistance of a person in need of rescue (from a violent
attacker, for instance) is not considered a criminal act. What most criminal law
courses fail to recognize, however, is that we have gradually increased the number
of laws creating duties to assist the police (or, one might say, to assist the victim or
society at large) by reportingsituations in which a crime is being committed. These
laws require reporting not only of crimes in progress, but also of past crimes.
Appreciating the extent to which we require people to intervene in criminal matters
by imposing legal duties to report their suspicions of criminal acts is an important
change in our understanding of American criminal law theory.
It also is useful to consider the growing reliance on reporting duties in the
context of another aspect of criminal law theory - the "public welfare offense."
While, on the one hand, we have shied away from Good Samaritan "duty to rescue"
laws, we have, on the other hand, imposed many duties on people in regulated
Id. at 167-68. Businesses are required to report their clients' suspicious activities to
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the Department of the Treasury. See infra
note 124 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
'3 See infra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
'o
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industries. To protect the public welfare, legislatures have provided criminal
penalties for the failure to perform those duties.'4 These statutes typically impose
liability on a strict basis, without the need to prove a culpable intent by any
particular corporate officer or employee"
Liability also may be imposed
vicariously on a corporate officer for the failings of an employee. 6
Reporting duties, particularly when imposed on people in certain regulated
industries, may be justified in the same way that we justify public welfare offenses.
Reporting duties differ, however, in that the causation of harm is lacking. 7 For
example, when a drug company mislabels a drug that is put on the market for
consumers to buy, we can justify imposing criminal penalties (perhaps even on the
basis of strict and vicarious liability) because the company's error is the proximate
cause of harm or danger to the public. If a drug company mislabels drugs, the
omission can be said to have caused harm by endangering the public health.
However, when a doctor fails to report suspicions of child abuse, it defies reason
to say that the doctor proximately "caused" injury to the child. 8
In environmental cases, thefailureto reportdoes not cause the harm - or even
necessarily aggravate the harm - even if the person who fails to report is the same
person who caused the discharge of hazardous substances. It is the act of
discharging the dangerous substances, and perhaps the failure to clean it up
properly; that causes the harm, not the failure to report. Nonetheless, most
environmental reporting laws apply only to the actual polluters, 9 so their causal
connection to the harm seems clearly to justify the imposition of a reporting duty.
Legislatures are not likely to repeal laws requiring people within certain
professions to assist the police or government agencies by reporting suspicions of
criminality or dangerous conditions, even if presented with persuasive arguments
in favor of their elimination. The politics of substantive criminal law tend to ensure
a broadening of liability every time prosecutors and legislators seek to "do
something" to appease a public enraged by a highly-publicized case.2" Because the
See infra notes 199-210 and accompanying text.
Id.
6 See infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
'7 The absence of any causal link to the harm is also one of the traditional arguments
leveled against Good Samaritan laws. See infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
" For a discussion of causation in reporting statutes, see infra notes 215-21 and
accompanying text.
'9 See infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPoliticsof CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505 (2001) (arguing that prosecutors and legislatures control the breadth of substantive
criminal law and that institutional incentives push for ever-expansive criminal liability). In
fact, the tendency to rely on the coercive nature of criminal law duties may be part of the
overall broadening of substantive criminal law, a trend that marches on relentlessly despite
scholars' insistence that the imposition of criminal sanctions should be circumscribed. For
example, Congress has not heeded the ardent advice of scholars to stop federalizing
'4

15
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elimination of reporting laws is not a realistic goal (and in some cases may not be
a wise goal), this Article has three more modest goals: (1) to raise awareness of the
gradual transformation of our legal culture brought about by the increasing numbers
of laws requiring professionals to report suspicions of criminality; (2) to place
reporting laws in their proper context in criminal law theory; and (3) to provide
some principled guidance in the way in which reporting duties are imposed. Of
special concern in drafting reporting statutes is the fact that, in some areas of law,
their primary use will be to create civil liability for non-reporters by creating a legal
duty under criminal law. Non-reporters of child abuse, for example, are rarely
prosecuted, but often are sued.2'
This Article proposes a simple change in the way in which reporting laws are
drafted that would ameliorate many of the shortcomings in the operation of
reporting laws: requiring a higher standard of proof to trigger a reporting duty.
Most reporting requirements currently are triggered by even slight evidence of
possible criminality.2 Legislators, obviously enthusiastic to obtain as much
information as possible by means of reports to the government, have set the
standards extremely low in all areas covered by reporting duties. Numerous
problems - traditionally associated with Good Samaritan laws and/or public
welfare offenses that also apply to reporting laws" - are exacerbated by the low
standard. In addition, since reporting laws abrogate many professional privileges
and confidentiality rules, a low standard does the greatest damage to the previously
protected nature of those relationships by maximizing the number of cases in which
professionals must disclose their clients' or patients' information.
Part I of this Article examines four types of reporting requirements: child abuse
reporting, elder abuse reporting, reporting by financial institutions, and reporting
of hazardous waste discharges. The elements of each reporting offense are
addressed, as well as the other policy issues relating to each category. Part I also
reviews the extent to which reporters are shielded from civil liability for their acts
of reporting and how reporting duties affect professional confidentiality and
evidentiary privilege rules.
Part II of the Article examines the relationship of reporting laws within the
context of two other areas of criminal law theory: Good Samaritan laws and public
welfare offenses. This portion of the Article considers the theoretical issues that
arise in each of those areas and demonstrates the way in which reporting statutes
traditionally state crimes. Id. at 508.
21 See infra note 64-68 and accompanying text.
22 See infra note 72 and accompanying text (child abuse); infra note 115 and
accompanying text (elder abuse); infra note 130 and accompanying text (bank reporting);
infra note 168 and accompanying text (environmental spills).
23 See infra Part III at notes 210-327 and accompanying text (discussing problems of
"line drawing," moral culpability and infringing liberty).
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find their place in substantive criminal law theory.
Part III of the Article considers three central issues that arise in relation to Good
Samaritan and public welfare offenses: "line drawing" (referring to how clearly
duties are defined), moral culpability, and liberty interests. Each issue is analyzed
in relation to reporting statutes. In each case, the argument for imposing a reporting
duty is strongest, as a matter of wise and just public policy, when the evidentiary
standard that triggers the duty to report is set at a high level, such as "clear and
unequivocal."
Part IV briefly examines the trade-off between obtaining important information
through reporting statutes and the harm done to professional relationships when
reporting statutes abrogate the privileges and confidentiality previously enjoyed.
This portion of the Article shows that the harm done to professional relationships
by imposing a duty to report can be minimized and that victims, as well as society
as a whole, can best be served by raising the evidentiary trigger.
I. CONSCRIPTING POLICE INFORMANTS BY MEANS OF REPORTING DUTIES
The idea of requiring members of a community to participate in crime control
dates back at least a thousand years. According to the tradition of the "frankpledge"
in England, "each frankpledge group (originally one hundred households) was held
responsible for making collective financial restitution for any property loss unless
they came up with the perpetrators within a specified time."24 According to
Jonathan Simon, "[t]he system imposed on them a legal obligation to report
offenses committed by other members of the group and to be financially obligated
for any failure to produce the offender at presentment."25
"English law recognized the crime of misprision that made it the duty of every
citizen to disclose any treason or felony of which he had knowledge. 2 6 American
federal law also includes the offense of misprision; however, it has been defined to
require an affirmative act of concealment in addition to the failure to report the
felony.27 In addition, American law contains several other offenses criminalizing
24 MARC L. MILLER

& RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 4 (Supp. 2001)

(discussing the work of JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL

CONTROL OF THE UNDERCLASS, 1890-1990, at 18-20 (1993)).
25 SIMON, supra note 24, at 18-20.
26

Robert P. Mosteller, ChildAbuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences:

The Reality and the Specter ofLawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE L.J. 203, 275 n.209 (1992)
(quoting 3 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 388-89 (1927)).
27

Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by
a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make
known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority
under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than three years, or both.
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the failure to assist the police, but these also require some form of active
obstruction. 28 With the exception of a few states, 29 American law has not
criminalized the mere failure to report a felony.
More recently, American legislatures gradually have threaded our criminal
codes with laws requiring people to assist the police by disclosing their knowledge
of certain crimes. The first generation of reporting laws typically applied only to
people within certain professions in which they were likely to gain information
regarding the type of offense the law sought to deter. For example, health
professionals must report child or elder abuse as well as other types of incriminating
18 U.S.C. § 4 (2000); see also 18 U.S.C. § 792 (2000) (harboring or concealing persons);
18 U.S.C. § 1071 (2000) (concealing person from arrest); 18 U.S.C. § 1072 (2000)
(concealing escaped prisoner); United States v. Gravitt, 590 F.2d 123, 125-26 (5th Cir.
1979) (detailing the elements for misprision); United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119,

1125 (7th Cir. 1970) ("[T]he offense of misprision... consists of an act of concealment in
addition to failure to disclose.").
28 The failure of citizens to assist the police by reporting their suspicions of criminality
should be contrasted with other offenses in which persons take affirmative action to hinder
a police investigation. Federal criminal law punishes acts such as lying to the police during
an investigation (misprision, false statement crimes, obstruction of justice), destroying
documents (obstruction of criminal investigation), making a false report to the police, or
giving advance notice of police presence to assist a felon's getaway. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
1001 (2000) (criminalizing the act of making false statements to federal law enforcement
officials); 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000) (criminalizing the influencing or injuring of an officer
or juror); 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2000) (criminalizing the obstruction of proceedings before
departments, agencies, and committees); 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (2000) (criminalizing the
obstruction of criminal investigations); 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (2000) (criminalizing the
obstruction of state or local law enforcement in gambling cases). Many states also punish for
misusing the emergency 9-1-1 telephone system. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-98-10 (2002);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 365.172 (West 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2931 (2002); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 190.308 (West 2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106-H:15 (2002); N.C. GEN.

STAT. § 62a- 12 (West 2002). The question of moral culpability could not be clearer in cases
in which people intentionally commit one ofthese offenses. These offenders are punished not
simply forfailing to assist the police, but for erecting barriersbetween the police and the
suspected criminals, thereby causing the police to waste their resources.
2'9See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (West 2002) ("No person, knowing that a
felony has been or is being committed, shall knowingly fail to report such information to law
enforcement authorities."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-11-12 (Michie 2002) ("Any person
who, having knowledge, which is not privileged, of the commission of a felony, conceals the
same, or does not immediately disclose such felony, with the name of the perpetrator thereof,
and all the facts in relations thereto, .to the proper authorities, shall be guilty of misprision of
a felony."); see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/30-2 (West 2002) ("A person owing
allegiance to this State commits misprision of treason when he conceals or withholds his
knowledge that another has committed treason against this State."); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
14:114 (West 2002) ("Misprision of treason is the concealment of treason, or the failure to
disclose immediately all pertinent facts to proper authorities, by a person who has knowledge
of the commission of the crime of treason.").
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information, such as gunshot wounds, serious burn injuries, and pregnant women
who have abused alcohol or controlled substances.3" Legislatures increasingly
require health professionals to report suspicions of domestic violence.3'
A variety of specialized reporting statutes that require the reporting of particular
offenses exist in some states. For example, Illinois punishes the failure to report an
offer to bribe the participants of a sporting event.3 2 Analogous to reporting statutes
are those that require sex offenders to register their addresses with law enforcement
each year or when moving into a particular jurisdiction.33 Though they do not
0 Numerous state laws require physicians to report gunshot wounds and even prenatal
exposure to alcohol or drug abuse. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 626.52 (2001) (stating that health
professionals must report gunshot wounds, wounds by dangerous weapon or serious bum
injuries); MINN. STAT. § 626.5561 (2001) (stating that health professionals must report
pregnant woman who abuses controlled substances knowing she is pregnant); MINN. STAT.
§ 626.5563 (2001) (stating that health professionals must immediately report if pregnant
woman has abused alcohol knowing she was pregnant); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22
(West 2002) (stating that health professionals must report gunshot and stab wounds).
31 Most of the laws apply more broadly to all injuries caused by violence, but were enacted
with domestic violence victims and/or elderly victims in mind. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
790.24 (West 2001) ("Any physician, nurse or employee thereof and any employee of a
hospital, sanitarium, clinic, or nursing home knowingly treating any person suffering from a
gunshot wound or other life-threatening wound indicating an act of violence... shall report the
same immediately to the sheriff's department."); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-7-30 to 27-7-31
(Michie 2002) (requiring anyone who has reasonable cause to believe that an adult has been
abused to report this knowledge or be guilty of a misdemeanor). For a comprehensive review
of the reporting laws as applied to domestic violence, see James T.R. Jones, Battered Spouses'
Damage Actions Against Non-Reporting Physicians,45 DEPAUL L. REV. 191 (1996) (arguing

in favor of imposing civil liability on non-reporting physicians as a means of deterring domestic
violence). Some commentators oppose the new reporting requirements. See, e.g., Mia M.
McFarlane, MandatoryReporting of Domestic Violence: An InappropriateResponsefor New
York Health Care Professionals, 17 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (1999) (arguing that mandatory

reporting may be contrary to the wishes of the patient and may endanger her safety); Virginia
Daire, The Case Against MandatoryReporting of Domestic Violence Injuries, FLA. B.J., Jan.

2000, at 78 (reasoning that victims may avoid seeking medical care or abusers will prevent
victims from getting medical help if reporting is required). New York's State Commission on
Domestic Violence Fatalities endorsed a limited reporting requirement for cases involving lifethreatening or serious physical injury. See COMM'N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FATALITIES, THE
ROLE OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1997); see also Jennifer Brown-

Cranstoun, Kringen v. Boslouth and Saint Vincent Hospital: A New Trend for Healthcare
Professionals Who Treat Victims ofDomestic Violence?, 33 J. HEALTH L. 629 (2000) (arguing
generally in favor of new guidelines, protocols, and laws aimed at identifying and treating
victims of domestic violence).
32 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/29-1 (West 2002).
33 See, e.g., People v. Martinez, No. BA160923, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1956
(Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2001) (involving a convicted sex offender who failed to register with
chief of police within fourteen days of coming into Los Angeles County as required by
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involve reporting suspicions of criminality, such laws require prior sex offenders
to report themselves to law enforcement as potential dangers, i.e., the presence of
a possibly dangerous person in the jurisdiction.
In most cases, the reporting statutes designate certain categories of
professionals as mandatory reporters. Others include a "catch-all" provision that
extends reporting duties to "any other person" who may receive incriminating
information.' Thus, the reach of the duty to report is not always limited to people
in professions likely to receive the information, but extends in some cases to anyone
who happens to obtain information. Once enacted, statutes without catch-all
provisions also tend to expand in scope by the addition of new categories of
mandatory reporters. a5
The most recent reporting statutes apply to all eyewitnesses who might be in a
position to aid a crime victim during or immediately after the commission of the
offense, thus creating a variant of a true "duty to rescue" statute. In response to the
brutal rape and murder of seven-year old Sherrice Iverson in which a witness neither
came to her aid nor called the police, California and Nevada both adopted
legislation requiring witnesses to report crimes against children.36 Congress
considered a bill to enact a reporting requirement for individuals who witness acts
of sexual abuse against a minor.37 Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania
section 288 of California Penal Code); People v. Ramirez, No. F034944, 2001 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 1589 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2001) (same). There is some indication that these
laws may not be working as a matter of keeping track of convicted sex offenders. See Kim
Curtis, Sex Offenders Failingto Register: Survey Says States Can'tAccountforMany Missing
from Database,HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 7, 2003, at 23A.
' Such is the case with some child abuse reporting laws. See Mosteller, supra note 26, at
217 (listing Texas, Rhode Island, Wyoming, Florida, Tennessee, Utah, Delaware, and New
Hampshire as states that have varying catch-all provisions that impose the duty to report child
abuse on "any person," "any other person," or "any person, including but not limited to [certain
categories of reporters]").
' See id. at 212; see also infra notes 124-67 and accompanying text (addressing the
expansion of mandatory reporters Under financial reporting laws).
' See The Sherrice Iverson Child Victim Protection Act, CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 152.3
(West 2002); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. 202.882 (Michie 2001); see also Angela Hayden,
Imposing Criminaland Civil Penaltiesfor Failing to Help Another: Are "Good Samaritan"
Laws Good Ideas?,6 NEw ENG. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 27, 41 (2000); Jennifer Bagby, Note,
Justificationsfor State Bystander Intervention Statutes: Why Crime Witnesses Should Be
Required To Call ForHelp, 33 IND. L. REv. 571 (2000); Jessica R. Givelber, Note, Imposing
Duties on Witnesses to Child Sexual Abuse: A Futile Response to Bystander Indifference, 67
FORDHAM L. REv. 3169 (1999); Justin T. King, Comment, "Am I My Brother's Keeper?"
Sherrice's Law: A Balance ofAmerican Notions of Duty and Liberty, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 613,
614 (1999).
37 See King, supra note 36, at 614. As of the writing of this Article in 2002, Congress has
not taken any major action regarding this bill since its referrals to Senate and House to
committees in 1998. See S. 2452, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 4531, 105th Cong. (1998).
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have had such laws since the early 1980s, adopted in response to a highlypublicized gang rape of a woman in a barroom in which none of the on-lookers
notified the police or came to her aid.l Other states have adopted similar statutes
that apply either exclusively to crimes involving assaults on children or more
broadly to all violent offenses.39
In the financial industry, federal regulations require banks and other financial
institutions to keep records and make inquiries about their clients' businesses and
to report suspicions of money laundering - or any other federal offense - to the
appropriate authorities. Thus, Congress has created an investigative duty for
financial institutions, in addition to the reporting duty. Not only does the law
require the reporting of suspicious activity that happens to come to the bank's
attention, but it also requires the financial institution to gather and maintain certain
information about the people who do business with the institution.4 °
Of the currently existing reporting statutes, the most broadly-applied types of
reporting laws enacted to date can be categorized into two groups: (1) those
protecting helpless victims; and (2) those aimed at preventing widespread or
systemic harms. Section A examines two types of reporting statutes within the first
category of protecting helpless victims: child abuse reporting and elder abuse
reporting. Section B addresses two types of reporting laws in the second category
of preventing widespread or systemic harms: the suspicious activity reporting laws
imposed on financial institutions and laws requiring the reporting of hazardous.
waste spills.
A. ProtectingHelpless Victims
The first category of reporting statutes concerns victims who might be
considered "helpless" in the sense that they are not capable of protecting themselves
from further harm either by escaping from their assailants or by seeking the
protection of law enforcement. Children and the elderly, considered to be
physically weaker and dependent on others, have been singled out for the special
protection of statutes requiring persons in positions to detect abuse and to report it
to the proper government agencies.4 '
38See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch. 268, § 40 (West 2002); see also Bagby, supra note
36,at 571-74 (discussing Massachusetts case and statutes requiring eyewitnesses to report
crimes or requiring witnesses to rescue).
" See Bagby, supra note 36, at 574 (describing state statutes and pending legislation).
40 See infra notes 145-56 and accompanying text.
4'The vulnerability of elderly persons has been the subject of some debate. As one writer
noted:
Many elders, particularly those over seventy-five, experience increased frailty,
primarily in their declining ability to carry out routine activities. Impaired
hearing or vision, slowed motor and mental response, decreased coordination,
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1. Child Abuse Reporting Statutes
The enactment of child abuse reporting laws followed quickly on the heels of
this country's awareness of the problem. Although child abuse in this country dates
back to the late 1600s and concerns about child protection grew throughout the 19th
century, 42 it was not until the early 1960s that the problem garnered widespread
public attention.4 3 By 1967, legislatures in all fifty states, the District of Columbia
and the Virgin Islands had seized upon reporting statutes as a way of protecting
children against child abuse." Then in 1974, Congress sought to bring additional
and many other physical and mental impairments - and the anxiety they
cause - make elders vulnerable to abuse and can affect the nature and effects
of abuse when it occurs.
Robert A. Polisky, Note, CriminalizingPhysical and EmotionalElderAbuse, 3 ELDER L.J.
377, 379-80 (1995) (footnotes omitted). On the other hand, critics of mandatory reporting
laws that do not require a finding of lack of competence on the part of the elder violate the
elder's right to self-determination and to reflect an ageist response to this social problem. See
Seymour Moskowitz, Saving Grannyfrom the Wolf. Elder Abuse and Neglect -The Legal
Framework, 31 CONN. L. REV. 77, 108-13 (1998) (addressing the arguments made by
proponents and critics ofmandatory reporting of elder abuse and neglect). Similar arguments
have been expressed with respect to domestic violence reporting laws. See, e.g., McFarlane,
supra note 31, at 25-29.
42 Caroline T. Trost, Note, Chilling Child Abuse Reporting: Rethinking the CAPTA
Amendments, 51 VAND. L. REv. 183, 189 (1998).
. Writers on the subject credit the publication of Dr. C.Henry Kempe's article - The
BatteredChild Syndrome - as the event that brought child abuse into the public spotlight.
See C. Henry Kempe et al., The BatteredChildSyndrome, 181 J.
AM. MED. ASs'N 17 (1962);
see also Steven J. Singley, Comment, Failure to Report Suspected Child Abuse: Civil
LiabilityofMandatedReporters, 19 J.Juv. L. 236,238-40 (1998) (addressing the historical
background of child reporting statutes); Trost, supra note 42, at 189-95 (same).
" Today all U.S. territories have laws making it a crime for persons within certain

professions to fail to report suspected child abuse. The following are the statutes now in
effect in the states and territories: ALA. CODE § 26-14-3 (2000); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020
(Michie 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (West 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12507 (Michie 2001); CAL PENALCODE § 11166 (West 2002); COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3304 (West 2001); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-101 (West 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 903 (2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1352 (1996); FLA. STAT. ch. 415.504 (1997); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-7-5 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1.1 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 16-1619 (Michie
2001); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4 (WEST 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-5-1 (West 2002);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.69 (West 2002) (amended by 2002 Iowa Legis. Serv. 2394 (West));
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.030 (Michie 1999); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 (West 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 401 I-A (West 2001);
MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAW § 5-704 (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 5 IA (West
2002); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.623 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (West
2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115 (West 2002);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-711 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. 432B.220 (Michie 2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN.
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attention and funding to the problem of child abuse through the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 (CAPTA).45 CAPTA aimed to assist the
states in implementing programs to address a continued problem of underreporting and to ensure that states created programs for proper intervention and
treatment. 46 Federal grants were available to states only if they enacted reporting
laws and demonstrated that a number of necessary procedures and programs were
put into place. 7 In addition, federal authorities created a reporting statute
applicable to potential reporters on federal land or in a federally operated or
contracted facility.4 8 Thus, by the mid-1970s, every state, U.S. territory, and the
federal government had adopted reporting statutes and other programs to encourage
people in a position to assist the helpless victims of child abuse by reporting their
suspicions to the police.
Generally, child abuse reporting statutes have similar elements: "(1) purpose
of the statute; (2) definitions; (3) professionals required to report; (4) standard of
certainty reporters must attain; (5) penalties for failure to report; (6) immunity for
good faith reports; (7) abrogation of certain communication privileges; and (8)
reporting procedures."4 9 Nonetheless, most state statutes include slightly different
provisions.
For example, the categories of persons who qualify as "mandatory reporters"
differ from one state to another.50 Robert Mosteller pointed out that the categories
of professionals subject to reporting requirements expanded quickly from the initial

§ 9:6-8.10 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-3 (Michie 2002); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
§ 413 (Consol. 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-543 (1993) (repealed by S.L. 1998-202, § 5, eff.
July 1, 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03 (1999); OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 2151.421 (West
2002); OiuA STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7103 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.010 (1995); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6311 (West 2001); 8 P.R. LAWS ANN., § 406 (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 40-11-3 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (Law. Co-op. 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 268A-3 (Michie 2001); TENN.CODE ANN. § 37-1-403 (2002); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101
(Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403 (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913 (2001);
5 V.1. CODE ANN. § 2533 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.3 (Michie 2002); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (West 2002); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2 (2001); WlS. STAT. § 48.981
(2) (1997) (amended by 2001-2002 Wis. Legis. Serv. Act 59 (West) and 2001-2002 Wis.
Legis. Serv. Act 69 (West)); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205 (Michie 2001).

L. No. 93-247,88 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (1994)).
' See generally Trost, supra note 42, at 192-93 (discussing the federal statutes' influence
on state reporting statutes).
41Pub.

' See Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State
Statute Requiring Doctor or Other Person to Report ChildAbuse, 73 A.L.R.4th 782, § 2(a)

(1989).
See 42 U.S.C. § 13,031 (2000).
4 Singley, supra note 43, at 239.
o See Mosteller, supra note 26, at 212-13.
4
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statutes limited to physicians and medical personnel.5 1 He explained that the
statutes follow two basic patterns. One type of statute lists the types of
professionals required to report, such as many medical professionals, including such
groups as dentists, optometrists, and physical therapists, as well as education
professionals and law enforcement personnel. 2 Mental health professionals,
including psychotherapists and social workers, also are typically included as
mandatory reporters.53 Other professionals, such as members of the clergy54 and
attorneys,55 often are included as mandatory reporters due to the role they may play
in counseling either the abused child or the abuser. The federal statute also includes
foster parents and commercial film and photo processors as mandatory reporters. 6
The second type of statute uses a catch-all provision that extends the duty to
"any person" or "any other person" in addition to the list of specified reporters.5 7
Texas prosecutors recently have begun using such a statute in child abuse cases in
which an adult knew of the abuse but failed to report it. 8 In one case, a mother
whose two daughters were molested by a man was convicted because she waited
two months after learning of the offenses to inform authorities and did so only after
the police contacted her with regard to other, unrelated offenses.59 Another woman
was convicted for failing to report that her husband had molested one of her
daughters, despite the fact that he had threatened to kill her if she told anyone of the
abusive activities.'
In another case, a woman and her husband had obtained
custody of the husband's young daughter from another relationship.6' The woman
later was convicted of five counts of failing to report that the child had suffered
Id. at 212.
52 Id. at 212-13.
Some state laws require individual police officers or other law
enforcement personnel, as well as judges and prosecuting attorneys, to file official reports when
they receive information of possible child abuse. Thus the laws remove the discretion of these
officials not to file reports. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-507 (2002). Law enforcement
personnel are also made mandatory reporters under elder abuse reporting laws. See, e.g., infra
note 85 (quoting Nevada's elder abuse reporting statute).
'

53 Id.
54 See J. Michael Keel, Comment, Law and Religion Collide Again: The
Priest-Penitent
Privilege in Child Abuse Reporting Cases, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 681, 687 (1998) (addressing
exceptions to many reporting statutes for statements made during confessions or for all
statements covered by the priest-penitent privilege).
5 Mosteller, supranote 26, at 217 (listing 22 states that designate attorneys as mandatory
reporters).
56 42 U.S.C. § 13,031(b)(7)-(8) (2000).
57 Mosteller, supra note 26, at 213.
58 TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 34.07 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1992).
59 State v. Harrod, No. 05-01-01748-CR, 2002 WL 1470322 (Tex. Crim. App. July 10,
2002).
60 Monroe v. State, No. 07-00-0523-CR, 2002 WL 15547 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 4, 2002)
(unpublished).
61 White v. State, 50 S.W.3d 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
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severe bruising, most likely caused by her husband, although some evidence
suggests that she also abused the child.62 In a fourth case, Texas prosecutors filed
charges against two non-English speaking, recent immigrants who were living with
63
a woman who was seriously abusing her five-year-old son.
The Texas cases are unusual in that prosecutors in most states do not invoke
their reporting laws against non-reporters, especially not non-reporters who are not
professionals within certain categories of mandatory reporters. 6" Rather, most of
the case law involves civil suits brought by victims against health professionals or
educators who fail to report. 65 Many states - but not all - have held that the
statutorily created duty to report, enacted as a criminal provision, gives rise to a
private cause of action for a negligent tort.66 Some of those states require plaintiffs
to show that the child sustained injury as a proximate cause of the reporter's failure
to report.67
Though there are many differences between child abuse reporting statutes, it is
fair to say that most of the statutes require some level of "reasonable suspicion,"
often phrased as "reasonable cause," to trigger the duty to report.68 Most statutes
62 See id. Interestingly, to the extent that the State's case offered evidence that she might
have caused some of the bruises, most ofthe evidence suggested that her husband had abused
the daughter. The defendant could have challenged the charges on the ground that the
reporting law required her to violate her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
She did not challenge the law in this manner.
63 Rodriguez v. State, 47 S.W.3d 86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
6 In a recent Indiana case that received nationwide attention, a woman was filmed by a
store security video camera as she repeatedly hit and shook her five year old daughter. The
woman's sister, who was also present, was convicted of failing to report the child abuse, a
misdemeanor under Indiana law that requires all persons to report. See Associated Press,
Mom Given Probationfor Videotaped Beating, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 15, 2003, at 2 IA.
65 See Veilleux, supra note 47, §§ 2(a), 17 (listing cases).
66 See generallySingley, supra note 43 (arguing against civil liability ofrmandatory child
abuse reporters).
67 CompareHam v. Hosp. ofMorristown, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 531,535 (E.D. Tenn.
1995)
(holding that a plaintiff may sue doctors for failing to report suspicions of child abuse if it
can be established that the defendants' omission was the proximate cause of the child's
injuries), and Lurene F. v. Olsson, 740 N.Y.S.2d 797, 799 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (stating
that a minor child may sue a music teacher for negligent infliction of emotional distress
caused by the teacher's failure to report child abuse by school employee), with Paulson v.
Sternlof, 15 P.3d 981, 984 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000) (holding that the child abuse reporting
statute does not create a private right of action, only criminal liability).
68 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-33-5-1 (1998) (stating that a "reason to believe" child abused
triggers reporting duty); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-301 (West 2001) (declaring that a "cause to
suspect" child abused triggers reporting duty); OHIOREv. CODEANN. 2151.421 (A)(1) (West
2002) (requiring a report if a child has a physical or mental wound, injury, disability or

condition that "reasonably indicates" abuse or neglect of child); OKLA. ST. AN., tit. 10, §

7103(A)(1) (West 2002) (stating that a "reason to believe" child abused triggers reporting
duty).
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do not require a heightened level of certainty, akin to the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal trials, or even the "clear and convincing evidence" or
"preponderance of the evidence" standards applied in civil trials. Instead, the lower
level of certainty of "reasonable suspicion" triggers the mandatory reporting duties
of these criminal statutes. By analogy, police need only a "reasonable suspicion"
of criminality to conduct brief investigative stops of individuals they encounter on
the street, but they must have probable cause to effectuate a custodial arrest 9 and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt to convict.70 Though it may make sense for an
individual to decide to share concerns with law enforcement, even if one does not
have hard evidence to support the concerns, it is another matter for the law to
criminalize the failure to report under circumstances in which the person has only
unsubstantiated, albeit "reasonable," suspicions.
The treatment of privileges is another area in which laws vary considerably.
The attorney-client privilege is most frequently, but not always, preserved in child
abuse statutes.7' The statutes typically abrogate other privileges for physicians,
spouses, clergy, psychiatrists, psychologists, psychotherapists, counselors, social
workers, and nurses.72 Commentators have devoted significant attention to the
problems faced by professionals who normally present themselves as providing
confidentiality to their clients' or patients' communications, but because of
reporting statutes cannot provide complete confidentiality.73
Frequently, professionals required to report do in fact report their suspicions.
Just as frequently it seems, they are sued for doing so. The reporting statutes give
reporters immunity from civil or criminal liability based on their making of a
report.7 4 Most states extend immunity to mandatory reporters, although most do so
6 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968) (stating that a brief investigative stop is
justified by police officer's reasonable suspicion of criminality).
70 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
71 See Mosteller, supra note 26, at 216-21 (demonstrating that twenty-eight states do not
include attorneys as mandatory reporters, and of the other twenty-two that do include them as
reporters, most preserve the attorney-client privilege); Veilleux, supra note 47, § 2(a).
72 Veilleux, supra note 47, § 2(a); see also Thomas R. Malia, Annotation, Validity,
Construction, and Application of Statute Limiting Physician-PatientPrivilege in Judicial

ProceedingsRelating to ChildAbuse orNeglect,44 A.L.R. 4th 649, § 2(a) (1986) (stating that
state reporting statutes abrogate physician-patient privilege in child abuse cases).
13 See, e.g., Alison Beyea, Competing Liabilities:Responding to Evidence of ChildAbuse
that Surfaces Duringthe Attorney-ClientRelationship,51 ME. L. REv. 269 (1999); Keel, supra
note 54; Malia, supra note 72; Ellen Marrus, Please Keep My Secret: Child Abuse Reporting
Statutes, Confidentiality, and Juvenile Delinquency, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509 (1998);
Mosteller, supra note 26. With regard to physician-patient confidentiality and domestic
violence reporting, see McFarlane, supra note 31, at 29-31 (arguing that victims, already in a
vulnerable situation, may not be forthcoming with their physicians if they do not trust that
information will be maintained as confidential).
'4 The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act (CAPTA), 42
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only if the reporters act in good faith." In some cases, however, members of certain
professions designated as mandatory reporters are presumed to have acted in good
faith.76 Thus, a plaintiff seeking civil damages for an erroneous or knowingly false
report must overcome this presumption by meeting a higher evidentiary standard.
A few extend absolute immunity to all reporters whether acting in good faith or
not.77
In sum, the low evidentiary threshold that triggers the duty to report, combined
with either good faith or absolute immunity from liability based on the act of
reporting, creates an incentive for health professionals, educators, and other
mandatory reporters to file reports of their suspicions. The fact that non-reporters
can be sued in many states for their failure to report adds to the impetus to report.
Several scholars have voiced concerns about overreporting, citing statistics about
the low rates of substantiated claims.7" On the other hand, the fact that reporters
must defend against defamation or negligence suits for their acts of reporting even if ultimately they prevail in their immunity defense - has led at least one
physician/author to believe that reporters will be deterred from reporting.7 9 The
extremely low rate of prosecutions of non-reporters also eliminates some of the
U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (2000), requires that states grant immunity from prosecution to reporters
in order to qualify for federal assistance under the Act.
15 Veilleux, supra note 47, § 2(a); see also Yuille v. State, 45 P.3d 1107, 1110
(Wash. Ct.
App. 2002) (reasoning that immunity applies only for good faith reports).
'6 See, e.g., Aylward v. Bamberg, No. 98-2119, 1999 WL 515203, at *3 (7th Cir. July 6,
1999) (noting that an Indiana reporting statute presumes that a reporter acted in good faith
which plaintiff must rebut); Dobson v. Harris, 530 S.E.2d 829 (N.C. 2000) (stating that a
reporting statute endows a reporter with a mandatory presumption that she acted in good faith
and plaintiff has burden proving bad faith). But see Yuille, 45 P.3d at 1110 (stating that a
reporter has the burden to prove report of abuse was made in good faith). See generallyEllen
Wright Clayton, To Protect ChildrenFrom Abuse and Neglect, ProtectPhysicianReporters,
1 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 133 (2001) (arguing for absolute immunity for physician
reporters); Curt Richardson, Physician/HospitalLiability for Negligently Reporting Child
Abuse, 23 J.LEGALMED. 131 (2002) (addressing liability of physicians and hospitals for good

faith, negligent reports).
77 See Veilleux, supra note 47, §§ 2(a), 15 (listing cases). But see State v. Harrod, No. 0501-01748-CR, 2002 WL 1470322 (Tex. Crim. App. July 10, 2002) (holding that a mother who
belatedly reported abuse of daughters was not granted broad immunity for criminal liability
resulting from earlier failure to report).
78

See Douglas J. Besharov, ChildAbuse Realities: Over-Reporting and Poverty, 8 VA. J.

Soc. POL'Y &L. 165 (2000) (arguing that a great deal of over-reporting, particularly regarding
poor children, occurs due to reporters' confusion about whether abuse or neglect is present,
combined with the vagueness of reporting statutes); Singley, supra note 43, at 237; see also
Associated Press, Hurt Minority Children Often Checkedfor Abuse, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct.
2, 2002, at 18A (study shows doctors more likely to suspect child abuse of Black and Hispanic
childrens' fractures and may under diagnose white children's injuries).
" See Clayton, supra note 76, at 142-44.
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coercive element of the criminal sanction. Thus, on balance, it is not clear whether
child abuse reporting statutes produce the desired level of reporting, too much

reporting, or not enough reporting.80
2. Elder Abuse Reporting Statutes
In the 1980s, a growing awareness of the problem of elder abuse and neglect
spurred the enactment of new mandatory reporting laws designed to encourage
prompt intervention by the State. 8 By 1993, all fifty states and the territories (with
the exception of Puerto Rico) had adopted mandatory reporting laws for elder
abuse. " Many states modeled their elder abuse reporting statutes on their child
abuse reporting laws. 3 As is true with many child abuse reporting laws, states that
have considered the issue have not permitted a civil cause of action based on a
failure to report as required by the criminal law.84 They designate as mandatory
reporters health professions, law enforcement, and those handling corpses.85 Some
0 Recent reports suggest that, at least with educational professionals, there may in fact
be a tendency not to report, even in cases in which the abuse is egregious. See Jessica
Portner,Ariz. Principal Convicted ofFailingto Report SuspectedAbuse, EDUC. WK. ON THE
WEB (July 12, 2000), at http://www.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.cfm?slug=42abuse.hl 9; Diana
Jean Schemo, Silently Shifting Teachers in SexAbuse Cases,N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2002, at
A19.
8" Sana Loue, ElderAbuse andNeglect in MedicineandLaw,22 J. LEGALMED. 159, 172
(2001). States also developed adult protection programs similar to children's protective
services. Id.; see also Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 80 Cal. App. 4th 485,491 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000) ("The focus ofthe [Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection] Act has always
been to encourage reporting of abuse or neglect.").
82 See Loue, supra note 81, at 173 (listing statutes).
83 See id. at 180.
'4 See Mora v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 710 So. 2d 633, 634 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(rejecting private cause of action based on failure to report elder abuse); Hoppe v. Kandiyohi
County, 543 N.W.2d 635, 638 (Minn. 1996) (disallowing a civil cause of action for failure
to report elder abuse).
85 For example, Nevada's statute designates as mandatory reporters:
Every physician, dentist, dental hygienist, chiropractor, optometrist, podiatric
physician, medical examiner, resident, intern, professional or practical nurse,
physician assistant, psychiatrist, psychologist, marriage and family therapist,
alcohol or drug abuse counselor, driver of an ambulance, advanced emergency
medical technician or other person providing medical services licensed or
certified to practice in [Nevada, ] ... [a]ny personnel of a hospital or similar
institution[,]... coroner[s,] ... [e]very person who maintains or is employed by
an agency to provide nursing in the home[,] . . . [any employee of the
department of human resources[,] . . . [a]ny employee of a law enforcement
agency[,] . .. [a]ny person who maintains or is employed by a facility or
establishment that provides care for older persons[, and] ... [a]ny person who
owns or is employed by a funeral home or mortuary.

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:3

statutes classify the clergy as mandatory reporters, but make an exception for
information learned in a confession.8 6 Attorneys are designated as reporters in some
states, but sometimes an exception is made for statements protected by the attorneyclient privilege.8 7 For attorneys in Ohio, however, the obligation to report seems to
attach to the status of being an attorney, regardless of the manner in which the
information was obtained - even if, for instance, it was obtained casually in
conversation with a neighbor. 8
Like child abuse reporting laws, the standards for triggering an elder abuse
reporting duty also vary considerably from state to state. At least one writer
commented on the difficulty faced by health care professionals (which presumably
affect other categories of mandatory reporters as well) from the vague standards that
are set.89 In some cases, statutes define "abuse" without reference to the intent of
the person inflicting the abuse.9" Thus, reporters have no guidance regarding the
extent to which the evidence must show intentional "abuse." Likewise, most states
do not specify the frequency with which a neglecting person must act or fail to act
to constitute "neglect."'" At what point does a caregiver's failure to provide, in the
reporter's opinion, adequate care rise to the level of neglect? Not surprisingly,
since elder abuse reporting laws are modeled after child abuse reporting laws, they
also typically require reporting if there is "reasonable cause to believe" that an elder
has suffered abuse or neglect. 92
9 3 highlighted the
One reported case, Easton v. Sutter CoastHospital,
troubling
aspect of reporting laws that mandate reports whenever there is "reasonable cause
to believe" there might be abuse or neglect. In Easton, the surviving son and
daughter-in-law of an elderly woman, Margaretha Winchester, sued a nurse and
physician who had reported their suspicions that the son and daughter-in-law were
neglecting the mother.94 The nurse, Don Moreau, had reported the suspected
neglect after unsuccessfully attempting to persuade the son to bring his mother to
the hospital to be treated for a urinary tract infection that had been diagnosed the

NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. 200.5093
REV. STAT. 200.5093 (1987)).
86

87

(Michie 2002); Loue, supra note 81, at 178 (quoting NEV.

Loue, supra note 81, at 178.
Id. at 179.

88 Id.
89 Id. at

173.

90 Id. at 173-74.
9' Id. at

176.

See Moskowitz, supra note 41, at 94-95.
93 80 Cal. App. 4th 485 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1084 (2001).
92

94 Id.
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week before." The son also refused to allow her prescriptions to be filled.96 The
nurse had visited the home in which the elderly person lived with her son and
daughter-in-law on four occasions.97 The evidence depicted a woman whose health
was failing and whose son did not want to "prolong her life a few days or weeks
longer."98 The son argued that his mother did not consent to go to the hospital.99
He claimed that the Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) took the elderly
woman from her home, even after she shook her head to indicate "no" when asked
whether she wanted to go to the hospital. 00 Other evidence, however, suggested
that she was unable to understand the risks to her health or to realize that there was
an immediate risk to her life.' The physician also reported suspicions that the son
might be using Winchester's pension in an improper manner, although the reported
decision does not state the basis for this suspicion.0 2
The plaintiffs contended that the nurse and physician made the report in bad
faith, causing them emotional distress.0 3 They also sued the EMTs and their
employers for forcibly removing the mother from their home. °4 By law, the nurse
and physician were required to report the case to the government if they had
reasonable cause to believe that she was a victim of neglect.' The EMTs also were
obligated by law to remove her for evaluation and treatment based on the report.0 6
The reported cases do not reach the merits of the plaintiffs' claims because the
defendants were shielded from liability by the provision of immunity. The court
simply dismissed the case against the reporting nurse and physician who were
immunized from civil liability based on the filing of the report.'0 7 The EMTs who
acted on the report by removing the woman against the will of her relatives, and
possibly even against her own will, were also immune from liability.' The court
disagreed with the plaintiffs' argument that immunity for the nurse and physician
should only protect them if they reported in good faith.0 9 The court considered the
legislative history of the Act - along with its plain meaning - and concluded that
I at 489.
Id.
Easton v.Maready,No.A093279, 2001 WL 1511263, at *1(Cal.Ct.App.Nov.28,
2001), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct.94 (2002).
'7 Sutter CoastHosp., 80 Cal. App.4th at 489.
98 Easton, 2001 WL 1511263, at *1
99 Id. at *3.
0 Sutter CoastHosp., 80 Cal. App. 4th at 495-96.
01 Easton, 2001 WL 1511263, at *1.
96

102 Id.

103 Sutter CoastHosp.,

80 Cal. App.4th at 490.

4 Id.at 489-90.
"I Id.
at 493.
106Id. at 495.
107 Id. at 494.
Id. at 495.
I08
'09Sutter Coast Hosp., 80 Cal. App. 4th at 494 n.4.
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the California legislature intended to confer absolute immunity on mandatory
reporters, stating that "the truth or falsity of the report is of no moment - the
privilege is absolute."" 0 Thus, the complaints against the nurse and physician were
dismissed. The court also rejected the tort claims filed against the EMTs on the
grounds that the Act clearly gives local law enforcement (who escorted the EMTs)
the authority to take an endangered adult into temporary emergency protective
custody and to take the person to the hospital for medical evaluation and any
necessary treatment. 1
This case illustrates two things: (1) the likelihood that a possibly erroneous
report will be filed and the series of events that such a report will trigger; and (2)
the lack of any remedy for caregivers or the affected elder from possibly erroneous
reports and groundless investigation and intervention. The report in this case
caused the EMTs, aided by law enforcement, forcibly to remove the elderly woman
from her home, possibly against her will. She was taken to the hospital where she
was intubated and treated for three days." 2 She died shortly thereafter, thus
spending some of her last days in a hospital setting when she may have preferred
to have been in her own home.
Was Ms. Winchester the victim of neglect, or did the nurse and physician err
in believing such to be the case? No court of law will ever decide these questions.
What we certainly do know is that, even if the report was erroneous, it was required
by law. Even when health care providers have some question in their minds as to
whether or not a particular set of facts indicates abuse or neglect, the law
nonetheless requires that they file a report if there is "reasonable cause to believe"
abuse or neglect to have occurred."'
A second case also highlights the fact that elders and their guardians have no
recourse when a clearly erroneous report is filed. In Muller v. Olympus Healthcare
Group, Inc., '4 a physician filed an erroneous report of possible elder abuse of a
father by his son, based on a negligent interpretation of the elder's arsenic levels.
In fact, the son had not poisoned his father, as was established by a toxicological
test revealing normal levels of arsenic in the father's blood." 5 The doctor did not
forward the accurate findings to the son or to the Probate Court supervising the
now-deceased father's conservatorship." 6 The son sued the physician for failing
to file a correction to his earlier erroneous report, which had caused the son to incur
economic expenses, as well as loss of reputation, and had caused his father's estate
Id. at 492.
. Id. at 496.
"o

112 Id.
"3
114

15
116

See supra text accompanying note 92.
No. CV0072945S, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1211 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 1, 2001).
Id. at *2.
Id.
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to suffer financially. The court upheld the dismissal of the claims based on the
immunity granted to reporters by the mandatory reporting laws."'
One unique difficulty with the elder abuse reporting laws is the intersection
between self-neglect and mental capacity. Over one-half of the elder abuse
reporting laws require reporters (again, mainly health care providers) to report selfneglect as well as neglect by caregivers. Ohio law, for example, defines "selfneglect" as the "failure.. . to provide.., the goods or services necessary to avoid
physical harm, mental anguish, or mental illness" to oneself."' The inclusion of
self-neglect as conduct giving rise to a reporting duty obviously is well-intentioned.
Elderly persons can inflict harm upon themselves as readily as others might inflict
it upon them. Unlike the case of child neglect, however, the state does not have a
"parens patrie" power to intervene on behalf of a competent adult who refuses to
provide proper nourishment or medical treatment for herself.' ' Since most of the
reporting statutes apply to persons based on their age (typically sixty or sixty-five
years of age), the reporting duty is triggered without regard to the person's mental
capacity, in effect, "presum[ing] incompetence on the part of the elder."' 20
This aspect of elder abuse reporting laws is criticized as violating basic notions
of adult autonomy and dignity, and has been criticized as "reflective of'ageism."""2
The elder may perceive greater harm from the ensuing investigation than from the
physical or mental injury she might have incurred due to her self-neglect. Of
course, if the elder is suffering from mental incapacity, then her self-neglect may
inflict injury that she would not choose to suffer if competent.' 22 Medical
professionals may have the training to distinguish between mentally competent and
mentally incompetent adults. Few reporting statutes, however, limit their discretion
to report self-neglect to cases of mental incompetence. In most statutes, the duty
is triggered by any suspicions of self-neglect of any person over the age limit,
regardless of their competency. 2' 3
. In sum, elder abuse reporting statutes, having been modeled
on child abuse
reporting laws, have many of the same features as those pertaining to child abuse.
Immunity is provided to reporters, and non-reporters can be sued in some states.
Some professional privileges are preserved, but most are abrogated. Elders'
communications with their health professionals are not confidential. This lack of
"1

Id. at *3-*5.

s OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.60(k) (West 1994).
of the state in child abuse and elder abuse

"9 For a discussion of the parens patrie power
cases, see Loue, supra note 81, at 180-82.

Loue, supra note 81, at 180-81.
Id. at 182; see also Moskowitz, supra note 41, at 108-13 (addressing controversy
surrounding the perceived vulnerability of elders as a group).
122 Loue, supra note 81, at 185-86 (addressing the disagreement among ethicists regarding
proper weight to be given to the wishes expressed by a competent person).
123 See id. at 176-77.
120
121
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confidentiality raises a concern that these individuals or their care-givers may be
deterred from seeking medical treatment for fear of being reported to the authorities
and subjected to involuntary investigation and treatment. Also, like the child abuse
statutes, the elder abuse laws present issues of ambiguity in defining abuse or
neglect and similarly low evidentiary thresholds to trigger a reporting duty. The
majority of elder abuse statutes typically fail to take into account the competency
of the elder. This becomes problematic as applied to the "self-neglect" provisions
of reporting laws, as it requires health professionals to report to the authorities the
conduct of a competent adult toward herself. The filing of such a report then
triggers a series of investigative actions. Thus, unlike the child abuse laws, the
elder abuse laws raise additional concerns regarding the dignity and autonomy of
competent elders.
B. Preventing Widespread or Systemic Harms
1. Financial Institutions, Businesses, and Attorneys: "Suspicious Activity
Reports" and Record-Keeping
Banks and other financial institutions are required by law to report their
suspicions of criminality by their customers or "insiders" within the institution. In
1992, Congress enacted the Annunzio-Wylie Act, giving the Secretary of the
Treasury the power to require the reporting of suspicious activities by customers or
"insiders" of any banks or other financial institution." 4 Financial institutions are
required to file uniform "Suspicious Activities Reports" (SARs) with the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network of the Department of the Treasury.' 2 5 The regulations
encourage, but do not require, financial institutions to file reports with state and
local authorities as well. 26 Congress aimed to "uncover and punish money
laundering, particularly in connection with drug trafficking,"' 2 7 but the Act extends
more broadly to any "suspected violation of Federal law or a suspicious transaction
The Act was passed as the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4044-47 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 22 U.S.C.). Then Congress passed the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2254 (1994) (codified as amended
at 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2000)). The provisions of the Act apply to all national banks, as well
as any Federal branches and agencies of foreign banks licensed or chartered by the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency. 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (a) (2002). The regulations define a
bank's "insiders" as "one of its directors, officers, employees, agents or other institutionaffiliated parties". 12 C.F.R. § 21.1 l(c)(1) (2002).
25 The implementing regulations are published at 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (2002).
126 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(e) (2002).
127 Nevin v. Citibank, N.A., 107 F. Supp. 2d 333, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining the
legislative intent of the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act).
24
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related to a money laundering activity or a violation of the Bank Secrecy Act.', 128
The reporting of possible violations enables federal authorities to investigate
possible financial crimes in order to initiate criminal charges as well as civil
forfeiture actions against the funds in the accounts held by the financial
institutions. 2' 9
Like the child abuse and elder abuse reporting laws, it also contains provisions
conferring on employees and their agents immunity from civil liability based on
their having reported a possible criminal transaction. 3 ' Unlike the child abuse and
elder abuse reporting statutes, however, the regulations requiring reporting of
suspicious transactions or activities do not proscribe a minimum threshold of
suspicion to trigger the reporting obligation. Any suspicion of "possible"
criminality suffices to require reporting. 13 ' Most of the courts also have interpreted
the "safe harbor" immunity provisions as granting an unqualified immunity for any
reports whether made in good or bad faith.3 2 The District Court of Puerto Rico
C.F.R. § 21.11 (a) (2002). The regulations also provide certain minimum dollar
amounts that trigger the reporting duty. For transactions aggregating $25,000 or more in
which the bank "believes that it was either an actual or potential victim of a criminal
violation... or that the bank was used to facilitate a criminal transaction[,]" banks must
report "even though there is no substantial basis for identifying a possible suspect or group
of suspects." 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (c)(3) (2002). The threshold drops to $5,000 if the bank
"knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect" that the law has been violated. 12 C.F.R. §
21.11 (c)(4) (2002).
129 In addition to the arrest and prosecution of individuals suspected of money laundering,
illegal proceeds deposited in financial institutions may be seized and forfeited to the United
States government under civil forfeiture law. See, e.g., Villalba v. Coutts & Co. (USA) Int'l,
250 F.3d 1351, 1352 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that the government filed a civil forfeiture
complaint against $200,000 in accounts at Coutts and other financial institutions, alleging
that the funds were obtained from money laundering); United States v. $15,270,885.69
Formerly on Deposit in Account No. 8900261137 in the Name of Sobinbank at Bank ofNew
York, No. 99 Civ. 10255, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12602, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2000)
(describing a forfeiture of over $7billion dollars transferred from Russia to the Bank of New
York as a means of laundering the money).
30 Any financial institution that makes a disclosure of any possible violation of law
or regulation or a disclosure pursuant to this subsection or any other authority,
and any director, officer, employee, or agent of such institution, shall not be
liable to any person under any law or regulation of the United States or any
constitution, law, or regulation of any State or political subdivision thereof, for
such disclosure ....
31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(30) (2000).
'1 See Stoutt v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 158 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D.P.R. 2001)
(finding that the bank enjoyed unqualified immunity for reporting any "possible violation"
and rejecting the claim that regulations required the bank to have probable cause and to act
in good faith).
13 See Lee v. Bankers Trust Co., 166 F.3d 540,542-44 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that neither
language, common sense, or legislative history support the good faith requirement for
128 12
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expressed concern in one case about "what could be an overly offensive potential
use [against a bank customer] of the disclosure and safe harbor provisions," but
"ultimately [found] that the unambiguity of the statute [providing immunity even
' 33
in case of bad faith reporting] overrides any court consideration.'
Another difference between the SAR regulations and the criminal laws
requiring child abuse and elder abuse reporting is that banks must abide by strict
confidentiality requirements regarding the filing of SARs.134 Courts have upheld
the refusal of financial institutions to disclose to any person involved in the
suspicious activity whether an SAR was filed, even when such request is made in
the course of discovery.'35 The SAR confidentiality requirement overrides any
disclosure requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34.136 A financial
institution may invoke the immunity protection of the Act without violating the
confidentiality requirement, as it is not necessary to admit to the filing of an SAR
37
in order to assert the immunity defense.
In a decision that appears to undermine the confidentiality protection of the Act,
one individual sued the FBI under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 3 8 to
obtain production of an SAR filed by a bank regarding his transactions with the
bank. 3 9 The court ruled that, although the Privacy Act"4 exempted the SAR from
discovery by the FBI, the Freedom of Information Act required its disclosure, noting
immunity); Stoutt, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 175 (following Lee). But see Lopez v. First Union Nat'l
Bank, 129 F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that good faith is required in order to
obtain immunity for filing SAR).
131 Stoun, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 175-76.
'34 Any national bank or person subpoenaed or otherwise requested to disclose a SAR
or the information contained in a SAR shall decline to produce the SAR or to
provide any information that would disclose that a SAR has been prepared or filed,
citing this section, applicable law (e.g., 31 U.S.C. 5318(g)), or both, and shall
notify the [Office of the Comptroller of the Currency].
12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (k)(2002).
135 See, e.g., Dubai Islamic Bank v. Citibank, N.A., No. 99 Civ 1930, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18525, at *4-*5 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Supporting documentation to the SAR, however, is
not shielded from discovery by the confidentiality requirement and must be disclosed. See Weil
v. Long Island Sav. Bank, 195 F. Supp. 2d 383, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
136 See Weil, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 389 (holding that the enabling legislation of the AnnunzioWylie Anti-Money Laundering Act is specific enough on the question of confidentiality to
justify the intrusion into the federal rules governing discovery). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
34 provides the rules for discovery in civil cases. Among other things, the Rule permits parties
to serve requests to produce documents and other materials on each other. See FED. R. Civ. P.
34.
Gregory v. Bank One, Indiana, N.A., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1006 (S.D. Ind. 2002).
3 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
3 Dupre v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. 01-2431 Section "J"(l), 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9622 (E.D. La. 2002).
1405 U.S.C. § 552a (1994).
'3'
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FOIA's "'strong presumption in favor of disclosure.""' Thus, the FBI was ordered
to disclose to the plaintiff a redacted portion of the SAR that contained information
pertinent to the plaintiff's request.'
This case involved a plaintiff who had
criminal fraud charges pending against him, but the court did not rely on this fact
in deciding the case. Since all SARs presumably contain suspicions of criminal
activity, it stands to reason that many such reports will often result in the filing of
criminal charges. Thus, SARs may not remain confidential in a great many cases.
After September 11, 2001, Congress focused its attention on the ability of
terrorists to use the American financial industry to its advantage. The USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 ' includes provisions touted as providing more regulation
of the "financial industry" so as to curb the ability of terrorists to use these
institutions to invest their proceeds.'44 The Act extends reporting duties, which
previously had applied only to a circumscribed group of financial institutions, to a
wide group of businesses that are "financial" only in the sense that they earn
revenue.' 4 5 The list of "financial institutions" (literally running from A-Z) now
Dupre, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9622, at *5 (quoting Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S.
164, 173 (1991)).
142 Id. at *6.
'I
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
144 One writer has explained that Congress sought to deter global terrorism by preventing
international money laundering:
The U.S. financial system is so big that foreign banks must interact with U.S.
banks almost as a matter of business necessity. Congress took advantage of that
enormous economic power to give the USA PATRIOT Act extra-territorial bite.
The Act allows Treasury to impose blockages and boycotts on financial
institutions or jurisdictions that in its judgment do not sufficiently cooperate in
the struggle against global money laundering. For example, U.S. banks may be
banned wholesale from dealings with a foreign bank that fails to answer a
summons for information from U.S. authorities. The U.S. assets of foreign banks
that participate in money laundering may be seized, even if the actual accounts
that were used to launder money are located abroad.
Rueda, supra note 7, at 151-52 (footnotes omitted). The Act also requires foreign banks to
submit to examination by U.S. regulatory, enforcement, and intelligence agencies in return
for being permitted to maintain correspondent or pass through accounts with U.S. financial
institutions. Id. at 186. This is one of"a series of measures that seek to strip away that level
of anonymity that foreign banks holding pass through accounts in the U.S. have traditionally
offered their clients," thus reducing the ability of criminals to launder money through these
accounts. Id.
'45 The Act defines "financial institution" to include:
(A) an insured bank ...
; (B) a commercial bank or trust company; (C) a private
banker; (D) an agency or branch of a foreign bank in the United States; (E) any
credit union; (F) a thrift institution; (G) a broker or dealer registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission... ; (H) a broker or dealer in securities
or commodities; (I) an investment banker or investment company; (J) a currency
exchange; (K) an issuer, redeemer, or cashier of travelers' checks, checks,
'i"
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required to report and keep records of their client's activities includes sellers of
cars, planes, or boats, travel agencies, dealers of jewels and precious stones,
casinos, and real estate agencies) 46 It includes government agencies such as the
United States Postal Service and any other federal, state, or local government that
engages in any of the types of business listed in the definition.'47 The definition
also provides for the Secretary of the Treasury to add "any business or agency
which engages in any activity... which is similar to, related to, or a substitute for
any activity in which any business [covered by the Act] is authorized to engage."' 48
The Secretary also can add "any other business ...whose cash transactions have
a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory matters."'49 This last
phrase seems to give the Secretary carte blanche to sweep almost any business into
the group of regulated businesses. If the list is supposed to include all high-dollar
businesses or businesses selling products that people purchase as investments, it
probably should have included antique dealers, and sellers of fine furs, art, or
wines. 0 The objective of this narrative is to highlight the extraordinary expanse
of "financial institutions" now required to maintain certain records of their clients'
money orders, or similar instruments; (L) an operator of a credit card system;
(M) an insurance company; (N) a dealer in precious metals, stones, or jewels;
(0) a pawnbroker; (P) a loan or finance company; (Q) a travel agency; (R) a
licensed sender of money or any other person who engages as a business in the
transmission of funds, including any person who engages as a business in an
informal money transfer system or any network of people who engage as a
business in facilitating the transfer of money domestically or internationally
outside of the conventional financial institutions system; (S)a telegraph
company; (T) a business engaged in vehicle sales, including automobile,
airplane, and boat sales; (U) persons involved in real estate closings and
settlements; (V) the United States Postal Service; (W) an agency of the United
States Government or of a State or local government carrying out a duty or
power of a business described in this paragraph; (X) a casino, gambling casino,
or gaming establishment with an annual gaming revenue of more than
$1,000,000 - which (i) is licensed as a casino, gambling casino, or gaming
establishment under the laws of any State or any political subdivision of any
State; or (ii) is an Indian gaming operation ...; (Y) any business or agency
which engages in any activity which the Secretary of the Treasury determines,
by regulation, to be an activity which is similar to, related to, or a substitute for
any activity in which any business described in this paragraph is authorized to
engage; or (Z) any other business designated by the Secretary whose cash
transactions have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory
matters.
31 U.S.C.A. § 5312(a)(2) (West, WESTLAW through 2002 legislation).
146 Id.
147 id.

Id. § 5312(a)(2)(Y).
§ 5312(a)(2)(Z) (emphasis added).
"' One gets the sense that perhaps Congress simply ran out of letters of the alphabet.
141

141Id.
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transactions and to report their suspicions to law enforcement by filing Suspicious
Activities Reports.
The USA PATRIOT Act also imposes law enforcement investigative duties on
these "financial institutions." For example, the Act requires that they "implement
programs to deter and identify instances of money laundering," and these "programs
must, at a minimum, develop internal policies and controls, designate compliance
officers, pursue ongoing employee training, and conduct independent audits to test
effectiveness of implementation and design" of the anti-money laundering
program."' They also must implement a "Know Your Customer" program."'
Regulations imposing a duty to implement such programs had been proposed just
prior to September 14th, but "[i]n March 2000, after receiving 200,000 negative
public comments, the Treasury Department abandoned the proposed 'Know-YourCustomer' (KYC) regulations."' 53 The USA PATRIOT Act ushered in a new set
of"Know Your Customer" regulations that maybe broader than the ones previously
proposed.' 54 Under the new regulations, financial institutions must do at least three
things:
First, it must verify to a reasonable extent the identity of any person
seeking to open an account. Second, it must maintain records of the
information used to verify a person's identity, including name, address,
and other comparable information. Third, it must consult a list of known
or suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations, distributed by
government agencies, to determine whether a person seeking to open an
account appears on any such list.'"
The Act provides the same immunity and confidentiality of the Anti-Money
151 Rueda,

supra note 7, at 150-51.

Id.
151 Id. at 167; see also John J. Byrne et al., Examining the Increase in FederalRegulatory
Requirements and Penalties:Is Banking FacingAnother Troubled Decade?,24 CAP. U. L.
REV. 1, 59-60 (1995) (stating that KYC guidelines were mentioned inthe 1970 Bank
152

Secrecy Act, 86% of the banking industry had established KYC guidelines by 1990, and it
was expected that the Treasury Department would issue KYC regulations by 1996); Daniel
Mulligan, Comment, Know Your Customer Regulations and the InternationalBanking
System: TowardsA GeneralSelf-RegulatoryRegime, 22 FORDHAM INT'LL.J. 2324,2364-66

(1999) (discussing Congress's decision to reject proposed KYC regulations in 1999).
154 Rueda, supra note 7, at 167.
"I Id. at 167-68 (footnotes omitted). In addition, covered financial institutions "must take
'reasonable steps' to ensure that a correspondent account provided for a foreign bank is not
being used to 'indirectly provide banking services for a foreign' shell bank." R.J.
Cinquegrana & Richard M. Harper II, The USA PATRIOT Act: Affects on American
Employers andBusinesses,BOSTON B.J., June 2002, at 10, 13; see USA PATRIOT Act, Pub.

L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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Laundering Act, plus it broadens the immunity provision to include any liability
arising from an arbitration agreement.' 56 Thus, as has been true for banks, the
myriad businesses now subject to the reporting requirement also will be immune
from any type of civil liability premised on the filing of an SAR and are prohibited
from disclosing whether an SAR has been filed.
Recent legislation and other government proposals would require lawyers and
accountants to report their clients' suspicious or illegal business transactions. The
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is "an international policy-making body
formed in 1989 to help coordinate the fight against money laundering."' 57 In May
2002, the FATF issued a Consultation Paper of "Forty Recommendations,"
including recommendations for requiring lawyers and other professionals to
investigate and report suspicious transactions by their clients. 58 The American Bar
Association Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession submitted
comments on the FATF recommendations sharply opposing the proposals to require
attorneys to report the suspicious financial transactions of their clients. 59 Within
the United States Department of Justice, an interagency group is also working on
drafting its own position on attorney "gatekeeper" responsibilities regarding their
clients's transactions. 1" To date, Congress has not enacted any of the investigative
or reporting requirements proposed either by FATF or the Justice Department.
In the aftermath of the Enron, WorldCom and other financial collapses,
Congress did enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The Act imposes greater
disclosure requirements on corporate counsel, private attorneys that represent
corporations, and accountants, in addition to other corporate officers.' 6 ' The Act
empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission to implement the actual rules
that will govern disclosures by corporate counsel, outside counsel, accountants, and
corporate officers of public corporations.' 6 2 With regard to attorney disclosures, the
116
See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3)(A) (2000).
157ABA Task Force Oppposes Requiring Lawyers To Report' Suspicious Financial
Transactions, 71 Crim. L. Rep. 648, 648 (2002) [hereinafter ABA Task Force]. The FATF
operates under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
an international organization compromised of 30 member countries, including the United States.
See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, MORE

ABOUT THE FATF

AND ITS

WORK, at http://www.l.oecd.org/fatf/AboutFATF _en.htm (last updated Jan. 27, 2003).
8 See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, REVIEW OF THE FATF FORTY
RECOMMENDATIONS: CONSULTATION PAPER (2002), available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/40RecsReview en.pdf.
'59
See ABA Task Force, supra note 157, at 648.
160 id.
161 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L.No.107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. 7201).
162 Jenny B. Davis, Sorting Out Sarbanes-Oxley: Determining How to Comply with the
New FederalDisclosure Law for Corporations Won't Be Easy, 89 A.B.A.J. 44, 46 (Feb.
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SEC's initially proposed rules required reporting of"evidence of a material violation"
of a securities law. 63 The provisions came under intense protest by the organized
bar. 64 The final rule increases the evidentiary threshold and requires reporting of

"credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under the
circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is
reasonably likely that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to

occur."'' 6 The initial draft of the rules are also required lawyers to make a "noisy
withdrawal" from representing the firms (which for corporate counsel requires that
they resign). This requirement has been tabled, and the SEC extended the period
for comment on that issue for an additional 60 days.166 Thus, whether attorneys will
be required to withdraw from representing clients has yet to be determined, but it is
clear that attorneys representing public corporations will have less confidentiality in
their relationships with clients when those clients violate the securities law.
2. Environmental Reporting Duties

Environmental law contains what appears to be one of the oldest regulatory
reporting offenses in this country, dating back to the early 1970's with the adoption
of the Clean Water Act 167 Today, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
2003).
'63Id. at 48.
'6

Jonathan D, Glater, A Legal UproarOver Proposals to Regulate the Profession,N.Y.

TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at C1.

Jenny B. Davis, Reporting Rule Clarified: SEC Releases Final Attorney Conduct
Rule, But Extends Comment Period on Noisy Withdrawal, A.B.A.J. E-REP., Jan. 31, 2003,
available at WL ABAJEREP Database.
166 Id.
167 Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) in 1972. Pub. L.
165

No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). The
Clean Water Act of 1977 supplemented the FWPCA. Pub. L. No. 95-217,91 Stat. 1566-1609
(1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). Subsequent amendments to
both acts are commonly referred to as "the Clean Water Act." The Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) adopted the same type
of reporting requirements that had been in effect under the Clean Water Act.
Senator Jennings Randolph, one of the original sponsors of the Senate version
of CERCLA, outlined the reasons for adopting the reporting requirements from
section 311 of the Clean Water Act into CERCLA:
Section 103 of [CERCLA] establishes the circumstances when notice
must be given to the Government of a release of hazardous substances,
including hazardous wastes. Notice of a release is the essential first
step which enables the Government to respond quickly to the more
significant releases, if the parties responsible fail to. The 8 years of
experience with the spill response program established by section 311
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Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) sets forth the reporting
requirements for dumping "reportable" quantities of hazardous substances.' 6 8
CERCLA requires that persons in charge of a vessel or facility from which
hazardous substances are released must, under certain circumstances, immediately
69
report the release to the appropriate agency of the United States Government. 1
Many state laws have similar reporting requirements. 7 '
of the Clean Water Act amply demonstrate the necessity of immediate
notice ifan emergency response program is to be effective in protecting
public health, welfare, and the environment. The Government response
program that would be established by this bill is modeled upon the
experience with the Clean Water Act's spill response program.
United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550, 1553 (quoting 1 SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T & PUB.
WORKS, 97TH CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL

1980 (SUPERFUND), PUBLIC LAW 96-510,
at 688 (Comm. Print 1983)) (quotations omitted) (alteration in original).
161 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (2000). See 42 U.S.C. § 9602 (2000) (directing the Administration to
designate reportable quantities of hazardous substances).
169 Id. § 9603(a).
"0 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-79-105 (2001) (stating that any fixed facility operator
or transporter shall immediately report a release of hazardous or toxic materials
environment); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25270.12 (West 2002) (requiring the
RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABiITy ACTOF

reporting of spills by owner or operator of any tank facility and providing for civil fines and
injunctions for violations); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25295 (West 2002) (requiring
reporting of spills of hazardous materials in underground storage); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§8-20-407 (West 2002) (requiring reporting by any person whose activity causes spill of oil
or any other substance which may cause pollution); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-450 (West

2002) (requiring reporting by master of any vessel or person in charge of any terminal for the
loading or unloading of any oil, petroleum, chemical liquid, solid or gaseous products or
hazardous waste, or reporting by any person in charge of any establishment or the operator
of any vehicle which may cause a spill of hazardous waste, and providing for civil fines for
violations); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6306 (2001) (stating that the transporter of hazardous
waste must report a discharge); D.C. CODE ANN. § 8-1317 (2002) (requiring annual reports
by businesses that release toxic chemicals or generate hazardous wastes); FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 527.065 (West 2002) (requiring reports of accidents involving liquefied petroleum gas);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.12(11) (West 2002) (establishing a felony for persons responsible for
vessels and terminal facilities to fail to immediately report discharges of more than five
gallons of gasoline or diesel); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-14-3 (2002) (requiring the report of any
oil orhazardous substance spill); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-400(5)-(7) (Banks-Baldwin
2001) (requiring reporting of releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances,
pollutants, or contaminants by any person possessing or controlling the substances); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2104-A (West 2002) (requiring the reporting of accidents involving
death, serious illness, or serious personal injury or in discharge of a hazardous material); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1318-B(l) (West 2002) (requiring the responsible party or person
causing discharge of reportable quantity of hazardous material to immediately report the
discharge to authorities).
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The requirement that persons in charge of vessels or facilities report significant
discharges of hazardous materials was designed as part of the "overall program to
'provide for a national inventory of inactive hazardous waste sites and to establish
a program for appropriate environmental response action.'"171 Thus, the statute also
contains record keeping requirements that enable the government to track potential
threats to the environment. The law requires owners or operators of facilities that
store, treat, or dispose of hazardous substances to notify the EPA administrator of
the existence of those hazardous materials, and to keep certain records of such
the identity,
things as the location, title or condition of the facility, and
17 2
characteristics, origin, and quantity of the hazardous substances.
The CERCLA reporting statute has generated relatively few published cases.
The case law reveals one important difference between the environmental reporting
statutes and most others: The reporters in these cases are required to report on a
discharge (and possible violation of law) for which they themselves are responsible.
The law imposes the reporting duty only on those "persons in charge" of a vessel
Thus,
(such as an oil tanker) or facility (any corporate or government entity).'
environmental reporting does not involve reporting the criminality of others, but
rather it involves reporting one's own tortious, or even criminal, acts. In some of
the reported cases, the reporting charge may be the only charge to which a
defendant may plead guilty, even though the defendant intentionally dumped the
hazardous materials and thereby engaged in more serious and substantive
environmental crimes. This suggests that prosecutors use the reporting charge as
a bargaining chip in less serious dumping offenses as a means of extracting guilty
pleas.' In other, more egregious cases, the reporting charge is one among several
7 Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119).
7 42 U.S.C. .§9603(c)-(d) (2000).
173 Courts have interpreted "person in charge" to include corporate entities as well as lower
level employees who may be "in charge" of activities at a facility at the time of a spill. See, e.g.,
United States v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84, 86 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that the jury was instructed
that "person in charge" applies to any supervisory personnel even of relatively low rank who
because he was in charge of a facility was in a position to detect, prevent, and abate a release
of hazardous substances); Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.3d 1291, 1292-93 (8th Cir.
1976) (holding that a corporation can be held criminally liable as "person in charge" under
Water Pollution Control Act (predecessor of CERCLA)).
71 In United States v. Liebman, 40 F.3d 544 (2d Cir. 1994), for example, the defendant
and his family owned a company that had entered into an agreement to sell its mill in
Rockville, Connecticut. The sale of the property was delayed by the discovery of asbestos
in and around a boiler room. The defendant was aware that it was necessary to properly
dispose of the asbestos, but nonetheless hired some local salvagers who dumped three
truckloads (approximately three tons) of asbestos into a gravel pit in the woods. Id. at 547.
Liebman pled guilty only to the failure to notify charge. Though the opinion does not say
whether there were other charges, one can imagine that he might have been charged with
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other substantive environmental crimes. 7 '
In many of these failure to report cases, the release ofhazardous wastes into the
environment was done intentionally in violation of environmental criminal laws.
In order to avoid the obvious self-incrimination dilemma of requiring individuals
to report their own criminality to government authorities, CERCLA contains an
immunity provision.

The law provides that "[n]otification received . . . or

information obtained by the exploitation of such notification shall not be used
against any such person in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury or for
giving a false statement."' 76 Thus, a self-reporter can obtain immunity for herself
by reporting her criminal acts of dumping hazardous wastes, and thereby avoid a
possible lengthy sentence.' 77 However, a self-reporter cannot avoid civil fines
imposed by the government or civil liability to other private parties. 78
In conclusion, environmental reporting laws are designed to encourage the
prompt reporting of hazardous waste releases in order to allow the federal
government to respond to the spill as quickly as possible. Clearly, Congress had
concerns about catastrophic incidents that could pollute bodies of water, water
supplies, or air in a community, endangering the people of the community. Unlike
the child and elder abuse laws, which aim to protect certain vulnerable victims, the
environmental statutes have the interests of the general public in mind.
other substantive environmental violations, including violations of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6986 (2000), which were dropped in
exchange for his guilty plea. See also United States v. Bogas, 920 F.2d 363,364-65 (6th Cir.
1990) (noting that the defendant, who intentionally dumped liquid wastes, jet fuel, and paint
into a large pit in the ground, pled guilty to failure to report charge and making a false
statement to federal investigators, but not to substantive dumping charge).
175 See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the
officers and operations manager of a chemical plant were convicted of numerous

environmental offenses, including a CERCLA reporting charge, for dumping untreated,
mercury-contaminated wastewater into Purvis Creek for a one-year period); United States v.
Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that the owner of a railroad-tie-treating
business was convicted ofa RCRA substantive violation and a CERCLA failure to report for

handling creosote - a hazardous substance - without a permit and intentionally dumping
a load of it and attempting to cover it up).
176 42

U.S.C. § 9603(b) (2000).

177
The defendants in Hansen, for example, received sentences that included long prison
terms, ranging from 46 to 108 months, and fines of $20,000 for two of the defendants.
Hansen, 262 F.3d at 1232. Had any of them reported their illegal dumping, they would have
obtained immunity from prosecution for those acts. See 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (2000).
178 United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) (holding that imposing civil penalties on
a person who self-reports spilling oil into a creek does not violate Fifth Amendment's right
against self-incrimination); United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 537 F.2d 149 (5th
Cir. 1976) (noting that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination does not apply
to corporations and that the right applies only in criminal cases, although Congress labeled
the sanction for failure to report a "civil penalty").
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Because oftheir nature as "self-reporting" requirements, however, the immunity
provision operates differently than those found in the child or elder abuse laws or
in reporting laws affecting financial institutions. In the case of environmental
reporting, only criminal immunity is provided. Since environmental reporters
typically cause the harm, the law provides for them to be made civilly liable for the
cleanup costs and fines.'79 Other types of reporting laws protect reporters from both
criminal and civil liability based on the information they report.
In short, environmental reporting laws may be viewed as so distinct from other
reporting laws as to be considered sui generis. De facto, they generally require the
same persons who caused the harm to report the harm, since they are the only
persons in a position to know of the spills. In recognition of the de facto selfincriminating nature of environmental spills reporting, the statutes grant criminal
but not civil - immunity to reporters for offenses related to the environmental
harm they have caused.'0 Alternatively, the other types of reporting statutes
discussed in previous sections grant civil, and sometimes also criminal, immunity
for liabilitybased on the act ofreporting.'8 ' Since environmental reporting statutes
are so unique in this sense, the following discussion relating to Good Samaritan
laws and public welfare offenses will not apply in its entirety to environmental
reporting laws. Still, some useful insights can be drawn from a comparison of those
areas of law to the environmental reporting laws, and a well-rounded discussion of
reporting laws would be incomplete without a discussion of environmental reporting
laws.
11. REPORTING LAWS IN THE CONTEXT OF SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW THEORY

Reporting laws imposed on professionals in certain industries find their place
in substantive criminal law theory among two related areas: "Good Samaritan" laws
and "public welfare offenses." One of the tenets of traditional criminal law is that
Common Law legal systems do not punish for "bad Samaritanism" or the failure to
render aid to a person in peril.'8 2 It is often said that we have shown a reluctance
to mandate that strangers help others in need of rescue, preferring instead to leave
that decision to each individual's sense of moral or civic duty. Reporting laws
create a variant ofGood Samaritan laws by requiring individuals to assist victims or the general public - by conveying information about possible harms or injuries
to the appropriate government agencies. Thus, whereas it is still fair to say that
See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
18o Id.
'a' See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (child abuse reporting), notes 107-10
and accompanying text (elder abuse reporting), and note 130 and accompanying text
(suspicious financial transactions reporting).
182 See infra notes 190-93 (reviewing the literature).
179
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American criminal law does not require strangers to come to each other's rescue,
reporting laws have imposed a limited duty to "rescue" by means of reporting
information to government agencies so that they may intervene.
Alternatively, it is well-established that people who choose to work within
certain industries must follow regulatory schemes to ensure the public safety. In
other words, the government imposes many duties on persons working within
certain industries in order to safeguard the public from harm. The failure to take the
measures required by law can be punished criminally as a "public welfare offense."
Thus, we have favored the idea that the law can properly impose duties on
professionals within certain industries to act on behalf of the public welfare.
Reporting laws fit within this paradigm as well, but again, not neatly. Duty-toreport laws also impose affirmative duties on persons within certain professions,
and they do so in order to protect certain vulnerable victims from harm or to protect
society from widespread harms such as environmental disasters or the erosion of
confidence in the banking system. The difference is, of course, that the duties
imposed on professionals to report are not actions required of them in order to
prevent them from causing harm to society through their negligent acts." 3 Rather,
they are simply being called upon to act as the eyes and ears of law enforcement.
Thus, as a conceptual matter, reporting laws take their place within criminal law
theory somewhere between the chapters on Good Samaritan laws and public welfare
offenses. The theoretical comparison to both illuminates our understanding of the
place that reporting laws have taken in our criminal law jurisprudence. The
important differences between reporting laws, on the one hand, and both Good
Samaritan and public welfare offenses, on the other, are instructive as well and
suggest that we reconsider the path upon which we have embarked. The following
sections examine the theoretical threads that tie reporting duties to both Good
Samaritan laws and public welfare offenses.
A. The Relationship to "Good Samaritan"Laws
Any discussion of "Good Samaritan" laws must begin with a discussion of
punishing crimes of omission. The standard black letter law regarding omissions
teaches that, as a general matter, American criminal law does not punish for acts of
omission, but only for acts of commission. As Joshua Dressler has written, "the law
punishes people for their wrongdoings, and not for their wrongful not-doings."' 84
Though the line-drawing is far from clear, "[a] 'not-doing' may be a moral wrong,
183 Environmental reporting statutes are the exception in this case, as the reporting duties
apply only to those who cause the hazardous waste spills. See supra note 173 and
accompanying text.
184 Joshua Dressier, Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About "Bad Samaritan"
Laws, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971, 975 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
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but a not-doing is not (usually) a legal wrong."' 85 Situations in which there is a
legally-recognized duty to act constitute the only exceptions. A legal duty to act
arises in certain circumstances:
(a) there is a special relationship between the omitter and the victim,
such as a parent and her child; (b) there is a contract (express or implied)
to act, such as when a doctor agrees to care for her patient; (c) a person
creates a risk of harm to another person or property and then fails to act
to prevent the harm from occurring; and (d) a person who has no original
duty to act voluntarily comes to the aid of one in peril, but then omits
further aid and, as a result of the omission, puts the at-risk individual in
a worse position than if no assistance had been undertaken.' 86
By way of example, parents, by virtue of their family relationship, have a duty
to provide care and nourishment for their children; hosts owe duties of care to their
guests, since they have invited them onto their property; a tavern keeper has a duty
to protect a patron from harm, such as from driving away from the tavern in a
drunken state.'87 However, strangers or others not in any legally recognized
relationship to one another typically have no duty to care for each other. Thus,
when a person fails to make any attempt to rescue a stranger in need of help, the
"bad Samaritan" cannot be punished for this omission, unless the legislature has
enacted a duty-to-rescue, or "Good Samaritan," law.
By statute, legislatures can create legal duties to act. True Good Samaritan
criminal statutes that impose a duty to rescue another exist in only eight American
states, although in some of those states, the duty to rescue may be limited to
witnesses of sexual assault or serious violent felonies, rather than a generalized duty
to aid in any emergency situation.' 88 In contrast, most European and Latin
I5Id. (footnotes omitted).
186 Id. at 975-76 (footnotes omitted).
187 See Hayden, supra note 36, at 33 n.47 (citing numerous examples).
18 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.027 (West 2002) (establishing a duty to report sexual

battery if one has reasonable grounds to believe that such an act has occurred, has the ability
to seek assistance for the victim, would not be exposed to threat or harm to self, is not an
immediate family member of the victim, and is not the victim his or herself; failure to report
is punishable as a first degree misdemeanor); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (West
2002) (establishing a duty to report crimes of rape, murder, manslaughter, or armed robbery
if at the scene of the crime and can report without danger to self; any failure to do so is
punishable by a fine of $500.00 to $2,500.00); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 604A.01, 609.02.4a
(West 2001) (establishing a duty to assist at the scene of an emergency if one can do so
without danger to self, any violators of which may be found guilty of a petty misdemeanor,
punishable by a fine not to exceed $300.00); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (West 2002)
(establishing a duty to report a felony if one knows it is being committed, as well as other
reporting duties pertaining to health care professionals and others with regards to stab
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American countries impose a statutory duty to rescue on all people in the
jurisdiction.8 9
Over the years, the question of whether such statutes represent wise or just
policy has filled the pages of law journals,'9 ° with influential legal philosophers on
both sides of the debate. 9 ' By and large, however, most American states and the
federal government have resisted the call to enact broad duty-to-rescue statutes. 192
Legislators have rejected Good Samaritan laws, even in situations in which there
is the loud outcry of a public angered by the callous indifference of a "soulless
individual" (to borrow Dressler's phrase) who witnesses a violent crime and does
nothing at all to help. 93 What we have chosen to do instead is to encourage
wounds, gunshot wounds, discovery of a dead body, and bum injuries); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-

56-1 (2001) (establishing a duty to assist at the scene of an emergency if one can do so
without danger to self, any violators of which may be found guilty of a petty misdemeanor
punishable by imprisonment not to exceed six months, a fine no greater than $500.00, or
both); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2001) (establishing a duty to render aid to one in grave
harm, if aid can be given without danger or peril to self, with a willful violation punishable
by a fine of no more than $100.00); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.69.100 (West 2002)
(establishing a duty to report for any witness of a violent or sexual offense against a child or
any violent offense, violations of which are punishable as a misdemeanor); Wis. STAT. ANN.

§940.34 (West 2002) (establishing a duty to summon law enforcement and render assistance
to a victim if the person knows that a crime is being committed and the victim is exposed to
bodily harm, any violators of which may be found guilty of a Class C misdemeanor).
'89 See Edward A. Tomlinson, The French Experience with Duty to Rescue: A Dubious
Case for Criminal Enforcement, 20 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 451,452 n. 2 (2000)
(citing survey of thirteen European countries) (citation omitted). Most Latin American
countries also have duty to rescue statutes. Id. (citation omitted).
190 See, e.g., Dressler,supra note 184; Hayden, supra note 36; Saul Levmore, Waitingfor
Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative
Obligations,72 VA. L. REv. 879 (1986); Liam Murphy, Beneficence, Law and Liberty: The
Case of Required Rescue, 89 GEO. L.J. 605 (2001); Tomlinson, supra note 189, at 452 n.6
(listing articles); King, supra note 36, at 619 n.42 (listing articles); Mark K. Osbeck, Note,
Bad Samaritanismand the Duty to Render Aid: A Proposal,19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 315,
316 n.8 (1985) (listing articles); Shaya Rochester, Note, What Would Have Seinfeld Done

Had He Lived in a Jewish State? Comparingthe Halakhicand Statutory Duties to Aid, 79
WASH. U. L.Q. 1185 (2001).
9' Compare Lord Thomas Macaulay, Notes on the Indian Penal Code, in 7 WORKS OF
LORD MACAULAY 493-97 (Trevelyan ed. 1866), reprintedin THOMAS C. GREY, THELEGAL
ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY 159-63 (1983) (arguing against a duty to rescue), with 1 JOEL
FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 150-59 (1984)
(arguing in favor of a duty to rescue).
192 Angela Hayden provided a thorough synopsis of the current state of Good Samaritan
laws in the United States: "Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Vermont all have statutes that
impose a general duty to assist an injured person, whether that person is injured as a result
of an accident, crime, or other circumstances. Wisconsin also imposes a general duty to help,
but applies it only to crime victims." Hayden, supra note 36, at 35.
193 Dressier, supra note 184, at 971 (discussing David Cash's failure to render aid to
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voluntary reporting by providing immunity from civil liability for persons who
194
come to the rescue of another person or provide emergency medical treatment.
Most states, therefore, impose no liability on people who fail to rescue, but provide
an immunity shield for those who do attempt to rescue.
The fact that only a few states have enacted duty-to-rescue statutes has led us
to believe that American criminal law generally does not impose a duty to "get
involved" when one obtains information relating to a crime. In fact, this is not so.
As Part I of this Article has demonstrated, legislatures have not shied away from
requiring witnesses to notify the authorities. Statutes that mandate the filing of a
report of suspected child or elder abuse, suspicious banking transactions,

seven-year-old Sherrice Iverson, who was raped and murdered by Cash's friend in a Las
Vegas casino restroom). A great deal of hand-wringing and anger followed the stabbing
murder of Kitty Genovese in the 1960s. Many of her neighbors, safely inside their
apartments, are said to have heard her screams for help for more than half an hour, but no one
helped her. Id.
at 972-73.
194 Every state has a statute providing immunity from civil liability for
any person typically also specifying medical personnel - who provides emergency assistance at the
scene of an accident, casualty, or disaster. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-332 (2002); ALASKA STAT.
§ 09-65-090 (Michie 2001); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-2263 (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95101 (Michie 2001); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2395 (West 2002); COLO.REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-21-108.1 (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-557b (2002); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 6801 (2002); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-401 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.13 (West 2002);
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2-374 (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.5 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 394421 (Michie 2002); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/1-120 (2002); IND. CODE § 34-30-12-2
(2002); IOWA CODE § 613.17 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2891 (2002), amendedby 2002
KAN. SEss. LAWS ch. 203; KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.668 (Michie 2002); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2793 (West 2002); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 164 (2002); MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-603 (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258C, § 13 (West 2002);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1501 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West
2002); MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-25-38 (2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.037 (West 2002);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-714 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,186 (2001); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. 41.500 (Michie 2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:12 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:53A-13 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-3 (Michie 2001); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 3000-a (McKinney 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.14 (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE §
32-03.1-02 (2001); OHioREV. CODEANN. § 2305.23 (West 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76,
§ 5 (West 2002); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.800 (2001); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8331 (West
2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-27.1 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-310 (Law. Co-op. 2001);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 20-9-3, 20-9-4.1 (Michie 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-218
(2002); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.001-.002 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-11-22 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 907(d)(1) (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01225 (Michie 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.300 (West 2002); W. VA. CODE § 55-715 (2002); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.48 (West 2002); WYO.STAT. ANN. § 1-1-120 (Michie
2001).
Note that Hawaii, the District of Columbia, and Vermont impose a duty to render aid
only to those involved in automobile accidents. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 291C-14 (2001);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 50-1001 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 3905 (2001).
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environmental spills, or on-going crimes do, in a sense, require the reporters to act
as "Good Samaritans" in coming to the aid of the particular victims, law
enforcement, and society as a whole by alerting the government to the need to act.
Some argue that the case for reporting laws is stronger than that for duty-torescue laws in that reporters are not actually required to intervene directly and
physically when there is a crime-in-progress or when a victim is in need of
assistance. Reporting laws require a simple phone call (and perhaps a written report
as well). 9' 5 However, Good Samaritan laws may be viewed as less intrusive in the
sense that they do not implicate any professional privileges or confidentiality rules,
whereas reporting laws typically abrogate most professional privileges. 96
' Thus, in
one sense society demands less of reporters as compared to rescuers since all that
society requires is a phone call. In another sense, however, the damage to
confidential relationships is a weighty social cost that should be considered in
balancing the costs and benefits of reporting laws.
B. Relationship to Public Welfare Offenses
The transformation of criminal law theory ushered in by the regulatory state and
"public welfare offenses" consisted of two fundamental changes, only one of which
has been closely scrutinized. First, the creation of public welfare offenses imposed
affirmative duties on people within certain professions or industries by means of
regulations, many of which carry criminal penalties.' 97 Second, public welfare
offenses often, but not always, permit conviction for the failure to perform those
duties without requiring proof of a guilty mind and without proof that the defendant
actually committed the proscribed omission to act.' 98 The strict and vicarious
liability nature of public welfare offenses has captured the attention of scholars for
decades.'" It also has been the main focus of legal challenges to public welfare
195 The

Arkansas Code, for example, requires mandatory child abuse reporters to notify
the child abuse hotline. See ARK CODE ANN. § 12-12-507(b) (2002).
196 See, e.g., supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (privileges abrogated by child
abuse reporting laws).
9 See infra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
198 See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
'99 See generally Francis A. Allen, The Morality of Means: Three Problems in Criminal
Sanctions, 42 U. Prrr. L. REv. 737 (1981) (arguing against criminal sanctions); John C.
Coffee, Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?:Reflections on the DisappearingTort/Crime
Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REv. 193 (1991) (arguing for reform at the
sentencing phase); Stuart P. Green, Why It's A Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:
Overcriminalizationand the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533
(1997) (arguing that identical conduct should be dealt with either criminally or civilly);
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 422-25
(1958) (arguing against the use of strict liability offenses in criminal law); Sanford Kadish,
Some Observationson the Use of CriminalSanctions in EnforcingEconomic Regulations,
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offenses.2"' The moral justification for the imposition of affirmative duties, on the
other hand, has received scant scrutiny. Reporting laws highlight the fundamental
importance of the theoretical question regarding the proper justification for
imposing affirmative duties on certain categories of individuals.
The Supreme Court justified the utilization of crimes of omission in the nature
of "regulatory measure[s]" as a means of "achievement of some social betterment"
in the early 1920s. 2"' Thirty years later, in Morissettee v. UnitedStates,0° the Court
gave a more complete justification for the imposition ofaffirmative duties under the
criminal law:
The industrial revolution multiplied the number of workmen exposed to
injury from increasingly powerful and complex mechanisms, driven by
freshly discovered sources of energy, requiring higher precautions by
employers. Traffic of velocities, volumes and varieties unheard of came
to subject the wayfarer to intolerable casualty risks if owners and drivers
were not to observe new cares and uniformities of conduct. Congestion
of cities and crowding of quarters called for health and welfare
regulations undreamed of in simpler times. Wide distribution of goods
became an instrument of wide distribution of harm when those who
dispersed food, drink, drugs, and even securities, did not comply with
reasonable standards of quality, integrity, disclosure and care. Such
30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963) (explaining economic regulation legislation relevant to the use
of criminal sanction); Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-CivilDistinctionand the Utility of
Desert, 76 B.U. L. REV. 201 (1996) (arguing for a sharpening of the criminal-civil
distinction); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utilityof Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
453 (1997) (arguing that moral credibility should be taken into account when creating
criminal law); Alan Saltzman, StrictLiabilityand the UnitedStates Constitution,24 WAYNE
L. REV. 1571 (1978) (arguing against strict criminal liability); Francis Bowes Sayre, Public
Welfare Offenses, 33CoLuM. L.REV. 55 (1933) (comparing the development ofstrict liability
public welfare offenses in the United States and England); Richard A. Wesseratrom, Strict
Liability in CriminalLaw, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1960) (arguing in favor of strict liability
statutes in criminal law).
200 See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (holding that a corporate agent
in a responsible relation to the commission of an offense may be convicted of the offense that
dispenses with the consciousness of wrongdoing); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246
(1952) (distinguishing public welfare offenses that require no culpable state of mind from
federal larceny statute that required proofofan intent to steal); United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U.S. 277 (1943) (upholding conviction of corporate agent under statute that does not
require consciousness of wrongdoing); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (.1922)
(acknowledging defendants charged with unlawfully selling opium and coca leaves
challenged indictment on the ground that it did not charge them with knowledge of the nature
of the substances they sold).
20' Balint, 258 U.S. at 252.
202 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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dangers have engendered increasingly numerous and detailed regulations
which heighten the duties of those in control of particular industries,
trades, properties or activities that affect public health, safety or
welfare. 0 3
It stands to reason that persons "in control of particular industries, trades,
properties or activities that affect public health, safety or welfare,"2 4 and who stand
to profit from such activities, should be held accountable for their negligent and
perhaps even their innocently harmful acts. (Whether we do so by means of civil
fines or criminal punishment is another matter.) Courts have upheld criminal laws
that permit punishment without regard to whether the person or corporate entity can
be shown to have acted with a culpable mens rea.20 5 They have done so, in part, on
the ground that people entering into regulated industries have a duty to inform
themselves of what is required of them.20 6 The assumption that underlies the
justification for public welfare offenses - both the imposition of affirmative duties
as well as the strict and vicarious liability nature of the laws - is that people and
corporate entities in these industries may be required to follow certain procedures
in order to prevent themselves from harming "the innocent public who are wholly
helpless.""2 7 Vicarious liability has been justified on the grounds that society may
properly impose a "duty to implement measures that will insure that violations will
not occur." ' Thus, corporate officers may be punished for the failings of lower
level employees, on the ground that officers should implement compliance
programs that ensure that violations do not occur.
With regard to reporting requirements or investigative duties, we are dealing
with the other side of the public welfare offense coin, not the strict/vicarious
20 9
liability side. Since most reporting statutes require proof of a culpable mens rea,
the issue is not one of justifying criminal liability for acts or omissions that are not
morally blameworthy. A mandatory reporter who fails to report may be viewed as
morally blameworthy in the sense of knowingly or willfully failing to report. The
issue, however, is whether people in certain professions or vocations (or anyone, for
Id. at 253-54.
Id. at 254.
205 See supra note 200.
206 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943).
203

204

207

Id.

United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658,672 (1975); see also Allen, supra note 199, at 745
(discussing the "morality of means" of vicarious liability justification in the Parkcase).
209 Reporting statutes have been held to give fair notice to potential reporters of their duty
to report upon obtaining "reasonable cause" to believe a report is required. See, e.g., Morris
v. State, 833 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Tx. Ct. App. 1992). The voluntary choice not to report one's
reasonable belief of child or elder abuse or of suspicious financial transactions can be viewed
a morally culpable choice.
208
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that matter) should be requiredby law to do the act in question.
In Part III of this Article, the principal concerns relating to both Good Samaritan
laws and public welfare offenses are applied to reporting offenses. With regard to
each consideration raised, the Article addresses the importance of reforming
reporting laws to set a higher evidentiary threshold for triggering a duty to report.
II.RAISING THE EVIDENTIARY THRESHOLD: AN IMPORTANT LESSON
DRAWN FROM GOOD SAMARITAN LAWS AND PUBLIC WELFARE OFFENSES

Is it anomalous to show a general distaste of Good Samaritan laws while
simultaneously embracing the expansion of strict liability regulatory offenses?
Interestingly, one sees parallels in the study of both of these areas of law, and yet
we have taken divergent roads with regards to each. Inconsidering the applicability
of the lessons learned from experiences with both Good Samaritan laws and public
welfare offenses, one discerns a simple change that by itself would greatly improve
the operation of reporting statutes: The threshold evidentiary standard that triggers
a reporting duty should be higher than the current low standards that typify
reporting laws. The following sections consider the issues of greatest concern
surrounding Good Samaritan statutes and public welfare offenses, demonstrating
how raising the evidentiary standard that triggers a reporting duty - preferably to
"clear and convincing evidence" - allays most of those concerns relating to
reporting laws.
A. Line-Drawing
Good Samaritan laws have been challenged on the grounds that people will
have difficulty discerning in a given situation whether they owe another person a
duty to rescue. "The most persuasive statement of the line-drawing objection" is

said to have been made by Lord Macaulay, who asked: "'What was a good English
gentleman in nineteenth century India to do when confronted by crowds of starving
beggars whose immediate needs would quickly consume his available
resources?'21. Did the duty to rescue apply to such a situation, and if so, "[h]ow

much money" or "exertion" would a person be required to sacrifice "to save a life
when each extra step [required to be taken, considered in isolation], is trivial?" ''
Clearly, legislatures can minimize the line-drawing problems by carefully drafting
statutes that limit the situations in which one must rescue to those involving serious
injuries or violent crimes. However, "Itihe question remains: What response
should we expect from the defendant who is an eyewitness to a life-threatening

210
211

Tomlinson, supra note 189, at 455.
Id. (quoting Lord McCaulay).
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peril?"2 12 No matter how carefully one drafts Good Samaritan statutes to reduce the
vagueness of the duties, there will still be imprecision in the factors on which we
decide liability: What is "reasonable assistance"? Is the victim in "grave" physical
harm? Can the assistance "be rendered without any 'danger or peril' to the actors
or others"?2"' While we might leave these issues forjuries to determine, the notion
of legality- that there should be no punishment without a clear notice of the law's
expectations - still concerns many scholars.2"'
The reporting laws also involve vagueness or line-drawing problems. However,
the ambiguity that may confront a reporter is clearly resolved in favor of the
broadest duty to report. To take one example from the child abuse reporting
statutes, if a hospital emergency room doctor treats a child whose injuries obviously
were inflicted intentionally by another (e.g., cigarette bums to skin), the duty to
report is perfectly clear. But what if the situation presents factual issues that do not
clearly indicate abuse? In Ham v. Hospital of Morristown, Inc.,215 a child was
brought to see an emergency room doctor for severe diarrhea. She also had blisters
on her fingers and an abrasion on her forehead.216 The child's mother explained the
cause of the injuries in a plausible manner, making the question of whether the
doctor had a duty to report a murky factual issue.217 If it had been a criminal
prosecution of the doctor for failing to report, the State would have had to prove
that the doctor had reasonable cause to believe that the child was the victim of
abuse and that he willfully failed to report his suspicions.2" 8 The difficult legal
issue would be whether such symptoms, if equally consistent with natural or
accidental causes as with intentional physical abuse, provides "reasonable cause"
to believe the child is the victim of child abuse.219
The law clearly promotes a regime in which the doctors should err on the side
Id. at 456.
Dressler, supra note 184, at 984 (italics omitted).
See, e.g., Allen, supra note 199, at 742-43 (discussing the legal concerns raised by
Dean Sanford H. Kadish in his writings on public welfare offenses).
215 917 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Tenn. 1995).
212
213
214

216

Id.

Id.
Since this was in fact a civil action in negligence, the court inquired into the standards
of care of the reasonable emergency-room physician to determine whether the reasonable
emergency-room physician would have had suspicions of child abuse based on the symptoms
exhibited by the child. See id. at 537-38. The physicians failed in their motion for summary
judgment. The court found a genuine issue of fact as to the reasonableness of the doctors'
conclusions that there had been no child abuse based on these facts. Id. Had the physicians
reported suspicions of child abuse on these facts, they surely would have prevailed by
asserting the immunity defense.
29 Presumably, since the statutes require a subjective intent not to report, a jury would
have to find not only that a reasonable person would have suspected child abuse, but that the
non-reporting defendant did in fact suspect child abuse and willfully failed to report it.
217

218
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of reporting any time a child's condition might be the result of abuse, not only in

cases in which there is clear and convincing evidence of abuse.220 It does so by
setting a low evidentiary trigger for the reporting duty - "reasonable cause to
"'
believe" - coupled with the provision of full immunity for erroneous reports.22
In the case of financial institutions, reports must be filed whenever a transaction
appears "suspicious," and reporters are granted immunity for erroneous reports and
have the *hield of confidentiality rules as well.222 The message is clear: Reporters
should report anytime a situation might cause a reasonable person to become
suspicious, and not only in situations in which matters clearly are illegal. In
exchange for their information, the law pledges to protect reporters from civil
liability should their suspicions prove to be unfounded. 2 3
24
To take an example from the banking area, in Lee v. Bankers Trust Company,"

Let W. Lee, a Vice President for Global Retirement and Security Services and
Managing Director at Bankers Trust, sued Bankers Trust for defamation over its
conduct in investigating his handling of certain accounts - leading up to his being
asked to resign - and of its alleged filing of an SAR."' The reporting regulations
require a bank to file an SAR if the bank "knows, or suspects, or has reason to
suspect" that a particular person has violated the law and the transaction involves
$5,000 or more. 26
In this case, Lee had asked two Bankers Trust employees, Plante and Callaghan,
to look into some older "custody credit" accounts that had been languishing
unclaimed for long periods.227 According to Lee, he asked Plante to do four things:
"(1) to clear all dealings with Bankers Trust's compliance department; (2) not to
transfer any money that was not properly documented; (3) not to transfer any funds
that might possibly be escheatable; and (4) to keep a detailed list of funds in the
reserve account. 22 8
When Bankers Trust learned of Plante's activities, they questioned him, and
"Plante claimed that Lee had told him to transfer escheatable funds into the reserve
220

See, e.g., Hamv. Hosp. of Morristown, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Tenn. 1995).

221

See, e.g., id.

See, e.g., id.; supra notes 124-66 and accompanying text.
223 Ofcourse, even if reporters ultimately are immune from liability, they nonetheless face
the prospect of fending off lawsuits. See Clayton, supra note 76, at 134-35 (lamenting that
physician reporters must still expend time, effort, and money to resolve lawsuits, even though
they ultimately prevail); Trost, supra note 42, at 187-88 (arguing that defending against
lawsuits for unsubstantiated reports deters mandatory reporters from filing reports).
22

224
225

166 F.3d 540 (2d Cir. 1999).

Id. at 542-43.

See 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (c)(4); see also supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text
(addressing reporting laws pertaining to financial institutions).
2127Lee, 166 F.3d at 542.
228 Id.
226
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account," a charge that Lee denied.229 Other Bankers Trust employees met with Lee
for five hours, after which they presumably concluded that Lee had engaged in
improper conduct.230 After this meeting, he was asked to stay out of his office so
that it could be searched.'
Approximately two months later, Lee was asked to
resign. 23' Although Bankers Trust made no public statement concerning Lee, the
233
press reported that Lee left Bankers Trust amid allegations of wrongdoing.
The litigation over Lee's resignation leaves many questions unanswered. Lee
claimed that Bankers Trust had filed an SAR with federal authorities and that it
contained defamatory statements.234 He must have known, given his experience in
banking, that an SAR would be filed, since Bankers Trust believed he had engaged
in suspicious activities.2 35 Bankers Trust refused to deny or confirm the filing of an
SAR, and likewise, they refused to disclose such SAR, if it indeed existed.2 36 The
law requires that a bank keep confidential whether it has filed an SAR, and the
actual SAR itself may not be disclosed.237
Lee claimed that immunity from liability for the filing of an SAR should only
apply to good-faith reporters, but the Second Circuit disagreed.2 38 The court
affirmed the decision to refuse to disclose any information regarding the alleged
filing of an SAR and affirmed the dismissal of Lee's defamation claim.2 39 The Lee
case amply demonstrates that banks may (and, indeed, are required to) file SARs
based on any suspicions they may have - whether well-founded or not, and, at
least in some Circuits, whether in good faith or not - and the person named in an
SAR has no access to the information contained in such a report.2 ' The filing of
an SAR can lead to a federal investigation of the person's activities that in and of
itself can cause embarrassment, expense, and inconvenience to the person, as well
as damage to the person's reputation in the community and in the profession.24' The
2 Id. at 542.
2 Id at 542-43.
'3' Id. at 543.
232

id.

233

Lee, 166 F.3d at 543.

M

Id.

2'3 See id. at 543 ("[Rlegulations... require financial institutions like Bankers Trust to file
an SAR '. . . after the initial detection of a known or suspected violation of federal law."').
23 Id. at 543.
237 See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text (discussing confidentiality requirements
of SARs).
238 Lee, 166 F.3d at 544; see supranotes 32-33, 37 and accompanying text (discussing safe
harbor immunity for banks that file SARs).
'3 Lee, 166 F.3d at 547.
240 See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
24' See, e.g., Besharov, supra note 78, at 190 (noting that unfounded reports of child abuse
suspicions trigger an "unavoidably traumatic investigation that is, inherently, a breach of
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bank, on the other hand, protects itself from liability based on the acts of its
customers, and even to an extent, on the acts of its insiders, by reporting any
suspicious activities.242
In contrast, the environmental reporting provision of CERCLA does not have
an evidentiary trigger that is too low. Since the duty to report spills is placed on
those in charge of the vessel or facility from which the spill comes, 3 one can rest
assured that they will know for a fact that a spill has occurred. The issues, instead,
are whether the spill is of sufficient magnitude to trigger the duty to report.
Environmental reporting statutes, thus, do not create a potential overreporting
problem such as those seen in other areas. 2"
In sum, in reporting cases - as opposed to duty to rescue cases - the line is
clearly drawn. The question of what circumstances trigger a duty to report is
decided heavily in favor of reporting. The problem is that, with the exception of
environmental reporting, reporters are required to report even in cases in which the
evidence of criminality may be weak.245 By allowing victims to sue non-reporters
and to prosecute non-reporters, in conjunction with providing blanket immunity for
erroneous or even intentionally false reports, the laws encourage the generation of
a great number of reports, many possibly unfounded.2 46 Obviously, unfounded
reports cause the waste of scarce investigative resources as well as damage to the
reputations of the falsely accused.247
Ironically, in cases of child or elder abuse, the misdirection of investigative
resources may undermine the ability of law enforcement to protect the very victims
the reporting laws are designed to protect. 2" The goal of mandatory reporting
requirements - to obtain as much information as possible about as many cases of
child or elder abuse as possible - may actually backfire, causing protective
parental and family privacy"); Clayton, supra note 76, at 134 (noting that "significant
trauma . ..can accompany investigations by state agencies" as a reason to discourage
mandatory reporting of child abuse).
242 See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text (focusing on disclosure liability).
243See supra text accompanying notes 161-72 (discussing requirements of CERCLA).
24
See supra text accompanying note 173 (noting that CERCLA only requires people to
report their own conduct).
245 See supra p. 9.
2
Professor Besharov estimated, for example, that three million reports of possible child
abuse were reported to law enforcement in 1997. Of those three million, it is estimated that only
about 800,000 cases of actual child abuse were substantiated. Besharov, supra note 78, at
180-8 1; see also Richardson, supra note 76, at 136 (noting that overreporting is "[olne major
concern" and that "[a] 1996 report from the National Committee to Prevent Child Abuse
showed a 31% substantiation rate among data collected from 37 states"); Singley, supra note
43, at 239-40 (discussing the same 1996 report on Child Abuse Prevention).
247 See Besharov, supra note 78, at 190 ("[Unfounded reports are] a massive and unjustified
violation of parental rights.").
24 See id. at 191; Richardson, supra note 76, at 136; Singley, supra note 43, at 239-40.
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agencies and law enforcement to miss opportunities at early intervention in serious
cases.249 Another consideration is the well-being of the children or elders who may
be removed from the custody of innocent guardians as a result of false, yet wellintentioned, reports. Finally, since the use of the courts is not a free good, we
should also consider the economic burden placed on the use of the legal system due
to erroneous and false cases. Raising the evidentiary threshold that triggers the duty
to report to clear andconvincing evidence can reduce the problem of overreporting
and protect victims from the harmful consequences of erroneous report s.25 °
B. Moral Culpability
Another traditional argument levied against both Good Samaritan and public
welfare offenses is that they criminalize conduct in circumstances in which the
person may not have committed a morally wrong act.25 ' Considering the arguments
made in relation to both types of offenses, the imperative of setting a high
evidentiary threshold for triggering a duty to report becomes apparent.
In the case of Good Samaritan laws, the refusal to rescue may not be morally
wrong in circumstances in which the harm may not have been foreseeable or easily
preventable.2 52 Though generally opposing Good Samaritan laws, Dressler
nonetheless opines that the best argument one could make for them is "retributive
in nature."253 He speaks of "two types of retributivists, both of whom could justify
'
such laws."254
The "culpability-retributivists" would impose punishment for
morally culpable behavior.255 If a bystander fails to act to prevent a blind person
from stepping off the curb into the path of an oncoming truck, is the bystander's
failure to act a morally culpable omission?256 "Culpability-retributivists" would
find the omission to be morally unacceptable, assuming that the bystander could
have prevented the tragedy without exposing herself to danger.257 The second type
of retributivist, the "harn-retributivist,"2 5 would punish the bystander if she has

See Besharov, supra note 78, at 191-92.
See, e.g., Singley, supranote 43, at 245-46, 269 (suggesting that the current reporting
standard of reasonable suspicion leaves reporters uncertain about required reporting).
251 See supra text accompanying note 41.
252 For an example of unforeseen harm, see Dressler's blind person illustration. Dressier,
supra note 184, at 982.
253 Id. at 980.
249

250

254

id.

Id.
"Culpability-retributivists" would argue that the decision of the bystander not to act is
"as much a matter of free choice" as the decision to push the blind person into the truck. Id.
255

256

257

Id.

2"58Dressier,

supra note 184, at 980.
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both the requisite culpability and if she causes some social harm.2" 9 By defining
"'social harm' as including the concept of "endangerment," then we might
conclude that the bystander caused harm to the blind person by intentionally failing
to act.26 ° Assuming that we have strong, reliable evidence of the bystander's intent
to allow the harm to occur, then the bystander deserves punishment by the standards
of a harm-retributivist.
In the case of a duty-to-rescue law, a physician who fails to perform CPR on a
heart attack victim whom she happens to encounter on a sidewalk would be morally
culpable, justifying criminal punishment, assuming, of course, that the doctor can
discern the nature of the problem and has received the requisite training to provide
assistance without endangering herself. What justifications could a competent
doctor give for failing to provide this type of basic emergency care when it is
necessary to save a person's life (especially given that she would be immune from
civil liability if she acts negligently)? While we would not say that the doctor
causedthe death if she failed to act in these circumstances, we may feel comfortable
saying that her omission ultimately contributed to the cause of the death.26 ' By
failing to prevent the victim from dying when it was easily within her power to
attempt to do so, she would have committed a moral wrong. The moral culpability
argument is thus fairly strong in the case of duty-to-rescue laws, but only in
circumstances when the need to rescue is clear and the would-be rescuer has it in
her power to do so without endangering herself. Of course, the doctor who failed
to rescue would not be considered guilty of homicide, as she would not be
considered the proximate cause of the death, but only of failing to attempt a rescue
(assuming that the law punishes this omission as a crime).262
The concern over convicting the morally innocent is a central theme in the
literature of public welfare offenses as well.263 Public welfare offenses raise the
familiar concern of imposing criminal liability based on strict liability for corporate
officers or employees who fail to take all the measures required by law to protect
the public.2" Since many of these types of laws impose liability without the
259

Id.

260

Id. at 980-81.

Cf Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389, 395 (Cal. 1976) (holding that a physician may
be liable in tort for negligence in failing to report child abuse if it was reasonably foreseeable
that child would subsequently be abused again).
262 See id. Leo Katz explained the distinction between an act (killing) and an omission
(failing to aid) as follows: "If the defendant did not exist, would the harmful outcome in
question still have occurred in the way it did?" Leo Katz, Crimes of Omission, in
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINALLAW 159, 161 (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999). Clearly, if the doctor
26

in that example did not exist, the heart attack victim would still have died; as such, the doctor
did not cause the death.
263 See discussion supra Part II.B.
264 See id.
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requirement of proving criminal intent, the question arises whether we are
punishing the morally innocent. 65 The jurisprudential justification finds moral
culpability in the officer or employee's responsiblerelationto the harm as well as
the person's responsibility to take measures to prevent any violation. 66 Any
deficiency in this justification is brushed away with the utilitarian argument that the
threat of criminal liability should be placed on those with the ability to minimize the
risks of harm (from impure food, for example) to the innocent public. 2 67 In other
words, the duty to act in order to protect the public is placed on those who would
cause the harm by producing a harmful product.
In the case of reporting statutes, the issue is not whether we can fault an
educator for failing to provide educational services, or a medical professional for
failing to treat a wound, or a bank for failing to handle its banking matters properly.
Should professionals in any of these professions fail to provide their services in a
safe manner, they can and do suffer legal liability. Rather, the issue is whether
those actors act in a morally culpable manner when they fail to report the harms
caused by another to the government. Of course, in environmental reporting, the
reporter typically does cause the harm, and statutes that limit reporting duties to
those responsible for hazardous waste spills (and grant immunity from criminal
punishment) avoid the question of imposing reporting duties on one not responsible
for causing harm.268
Interestingly, legislatures have not expressed a retributive imperative of
punishing wrongdoing non-reporters. As the courts frequently point out, the
legislative history of many reporting statutes express the purpose to "encourage"
reporting.2 69 To encourage action is, of course, the opposite of deterring it. Thus,
courts speak in the language of utilitarianism when they expansively interpret the
duty to report, rather than focusing on the moral culpability of the non-reporters.27 °
If one views retribution as a proper basis (or the only proper basis) for criminal
punishment, then there should be a finding of moral fault in the failure to report to
justify criminal punishment. A purely utilitarian justification raises even greater
concerns than the imposition of strict liability in public welfare offenses, since the
non-reporter cannot be said to have caused the harm of child or elder abuse or the
See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (discussing public welfare offenses).
See supra text accompanying notes 154-56.
See supra text accompanying notes 201-08.
See supra text accompanying notes 179-80 (comparing reporting requirements of
CERCLA with other areas).
269 See, e.g., Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 80 Cal. App. 4th 485, 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1084 (2001) ("The focus of the [Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult
Civil Protection] Act has always been to encourage reporting of abuse or neglect.") (citation
omitted).
270 See Dressler, supra note 184, at 981 (arguing that criminal law should punish people
for their culpable acts, not their bad character).
265
266
267
268
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misuse of the financial sector.27 '
On the other hand, there is a sensethat reporting suspicions of wrongdoing (as
a means of providing some assistance to victims or law enforcement) may be a
moral imperative under some circumstances, justifying the imposition of a legal
duty. Returning a child who has suffered serious abuse into the hands of her abuser
without taking any action to prevent further abuse would strike us as unacceptably
callous. The thirty-eight neighbors of Kitty Genovese who failed to call the police
when they heard her cries for help as she was being stabbed to death clearly failed
in their moral obligation to help her.2" So, too, did David Cash when he failed to
call the police while his friend raped and killed seven-year-old Sherrice Iverson.273
Even banks that knowingly do business with money launderers fail in their moral
obligation to society if they do not report their knowledge of criminality.274 In all
of these examples, however, the moral culpability of the non-reporter becomes clear
only when the evidence of criminality is clear and convincing.
Reporters also must have the ability to report without endangering themselves
before they are considered to be morally culpable for failing to report. The
neighbors of Kitty Genovese and David Cash had the ability to report without
alerting the wrongdoer that they were reporting. The on-lookers of a barroom gang
rape, on the other hand, may have had first-hand knowledge of a criminal act that
might have been cut short by reporting the crime to the police,275 but they may not
have been in a position to report the event without putting their own safety at risk.276
One of the gang rapists might have detected an attempt to report and assaulted the
person making the report.
Thus, criminal punishment for non-reporting can be justified on retributive
grounds only in cases in which the duty to report is imposed on one who causes the
harm, as in environmental reporting, or on one who has sufficient reliable evidence
of criminality, and only then if the non-reporter could have reported without
endangering herself or anyone else.
When evidence of criminality is weak, the question of whether there is a moral
imperative to report may be ambiguous, at best, even to the most conscientious and
civic-minded person. For example, in Pesce v. J. SterlingMorton High School,277
a high school psychologist, Dr. Pesce, delayed reporting his suspicions of child
sexual abuse of a student by a teacher for two weeks while he considered the legal
See discussion supra Part II.
See Dressier, supra note 184, at 972-73.
See supranote 193 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text (discussing the responsibility ofbanks
to report suspected criminal activity).
175 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
276 See supranote 188 and accompanying text.
27
272
273
274

277

830 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1987).
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and psychological implications of his decision whether to report."' Initially, he had
only unsubstantiated rumors that a male faculty member might be sexually abusing
a student and that the student was consequently exhibiting suicidal tendencies.2" 9
Dr. Pesce sought the advice of an attorney and a psychologist and "considered
relevant state laws, school regulations and guidelines of the American
Psychological Association" before deciding not to report the suspicions."8 He did,
however, arrange for the student to be seen by a therapist.2 ' Two weeks later, Dr.
Pesce met with the student and the therapist to discuss the question of whether to
report the suspicions.8 At that meeting, the student admitted that there had indeed
been sexual abuse by the teacher.283 Dr. Pesce then immediately filed an oral
28 4
report.
Although he might have been prosecuted for the delay, he was not, nor was he
sued. The school board, however, suspended him for five days and then
'demoted"' him from .'School Psychologist' to 'School Psychologist for the
Behavior Disorders Program.' 28 5 Dr. Pesce sued the school, claiming a denial of
his due process rights.28 6 The example starkly illustrates that reporters may (and
perhaps generally do) struggle with the ethical and practical complexity of the
decision whether to report. Presumably, Dr. Pesce was balancing the duty to report
and avoiding liability for failing to report, as well as the benefits of a police
investigation in preventing any possible future abuse, against the possibility that the
rumors were false and the harm to a potentially innocent teacher's reputation, as
well as the harm to the student for violating the confidentiality of the
psychotherapist-patient relationship.2 7
This case further illustrated that, depending on the quality of the information
a potential reporter obtains, a reporter may in good faith determine that reporting
is not a morally right decision, even if the flimsy evidence in his possession would
be enough to trigger the reporting requirements.2 8 When Dr. Pesce's information
278

Id. at 790; see also Singley, supra note 43, at 254-56 (discussing the Pesce case).
F.2d at 790.

279 Pesce, 830
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id.
Pesce, 830 F.2d at 791.
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Id.
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For a discussion of evidentiary privileges and confidentiality rules, see supra notes

71-80 and accompanying text.
288 In Kimberly S.M. v. Bedford Cent. Sch., 649 N.Y.S.2d 588 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996), the

court rejected a teacher's defense for failing to report in which she claimed that she believed
she did not have a duty to report suspicions of child abuse because the alleged abuser lived

in another state and did not have custody of the child. The statute only requires reporting
child abuse that is directly caused or allowed to be caused by a "person 'legally responsible'
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consisted of unsubstantiated rumors, he concluded that reporting was not
necessary. 2s9 It was not until he received first-hand information from the victim that
the moral propriety of reporting became apparent to him or, perhaps, that the legal
duty to report became clear to him (thus, imposing on him a moral duty to obey the
law)2 9° and/or the benefits of reporting seemed to him to outweigh the costs. Thus,
the decision may have been based on both moral and utilitarian grounds, but the
point is that the moral imperative of reporting is not always clear. One's view of
the moral rightness of reporting may change overtime as better evidence becomes
available to the potential reporter.
C. Infringes IndividualLiberty
Both Good Samaritan and public welfare offenses evoke concerns about
infringing political freedoms by weakening or dismantling the traditional
protections against overreaching government power. Because "criminal law is the
heavy artillery of society," Francis Allen reminded us that the "very weight of
criminal sanctions requires societies valuing individual volition to erect principles
of containment in order that the powers of government employed in law
enforcement may be prevented from overreaching their bounds and destroying or
impairing basic political values."29'
Allen urges us to evaluate the body of penal prescriptions from the perspective
of the "morality of means," and not just the "morality of ends."'292 The morality of
ends refers to the social objectives that motivate legislators to enact new criminal
provisions - protecting society from impure food, deterring child or elder abuse,
etc. In the context of reporting statutes, one could hardly argue against the
importance of the goals of those statutes. Clearly, the ends of protecting vulnerable
victims or preventing widespread harms have compelling moral force.
On the other hand, Allen urges that we consider as well the morality of means:
for the child. Id. at 590 (quoting Family Court Act § 1012(e)(iii)). The court stated that if the
teacher had 'reasonable cause' to suspect" child abuse, the teacher has a duty to report the
suspicion.
It is not the duty of the mandated reporter to assess whether the [statute would
apply to the suspected abuser].... If she has reasonable cause to suspect that
a child has been sexually abused, the reporter must report immediately. It is the
duty of the investigatingagency to determine whetherthe reportwas founded."

Bedford, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 591 (emphasis added).
289 Pesce, 830 F.2d at 790.
296 Stuart Green pointed out that with malumprohibitumoffenses, the moral wrongfulness
of the offense may derive from a person knowingly failing to perform a duty required by law,
even if the omission is not in itself intrinsically wrongful in the sense of violating social
norms of morality. Green, supra note 199, at 1612-13.
291 Allen, supra note 199, at 738-39.
292

Id. at 740.
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"the propriety - the effectiveness and decency - of devices proposed to achieve
' 3 In addressing the rise of
social objectives."29
the welfare state and the adoption of
public welfare offenses, he argued that the laudable social objectives that prompted
the passage of many strict liability regulatory offenses should have been weighed
against the possibility that "there are alternative civil sanctions more likely to
achieve the legislative purpose and at less social cost."294 Public welfare offenses
often relax or eliminate the "traditional requirements of clarity in the definition of
offenses, the maxim that guilt is personal, and the proposition that proof of guilt
requires a showing by the government that the offender acted with criminal
'
knowledge or purpose."295
Yet, these same "principles evolved by our law to
contain the powers of government in the criminal arena, a containment thought to
'
be mandated by basic political values."296
Thus, Allen expressed concern that the
loosening of requirements in public welfare offenses will lead to unfair denials of
liberty through government overreaching. 97
Liberty concerns apply with equal force to Good Samaritan laws and reporting
offenses. In part, the liberty argument with regard to Good Samaritan laws and
reporting statutes centers on the fact that these laws punish for omissions. Leo Katz
explained the deeper, moral reason why acts of omission offend us less than acts of
commission. 9 ' He explained:
Compare these two situations. (1) Bert will die unless Berta gives him
one of her kidneys. Berta is ailing and doesn't want to risk an operation.
So she lets Bert die. (2) Berta will die unless Bert gives her his only
kidney. She kills Bert and takes his kidney. In both I and 2 Berta brings
about Bert's death to assure her own survival; in 1 she does it by an
omission, in 2 by an act. Why are we less offended by her conduct in 1
than in 2? Because in 1 she simply holds on to her own kidney, whereas
in 2 she appropriates somebody else's kidney. We value personal
autonomy and Berta's conduct in 2 offends against that value, while her
conduct in 1 doesn't .... The person who fails to prevent harm that
would occur even if he didn't exist simply fails to give away something
he owns. The person who brings about harm that wouldn't occur if he
didn't exist takes away something owned by someone else. Both
persons may be callous, but only the latter offends our sense of personal
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Id.
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Id. at 740.

295 Id. at 742-43.
296 Id. at 743.
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Allen, supra note 199, at 742-43.
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See Katz, supra note 262.
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The omission of "fail[ing] to give something away" may say something
important about a person's moral character," 0 but it may not justify criminal
punishment. As Dressier explained:
A penal law that prohibits a person from doing X (e.g., unjustifiably
killing another person) permits that individual to do anything other than
X (assuming no other negative duty). In contrast, a law that requiresa
person to do Y (e.g., help a bystander) bars that person from doing
anything other than Y.... [I]n a society that generally values personal
autonomy, we need to be exceptionally cautious about enacting laws that
compel us to benefit others, rather than passing laws that simply require
us not to harm others.3 0
Reporting statutes, like Good Samaritan laws, clearly infringe on the liberty of
299

Id. at 162-63.

'ooId. at 163.
301 See Dressler, supra note 184, at 986-87. John Coffee expressed concern about a
second type of infringement of liberty interests: the power given to prosecutors through
expansive public welfare offenses. He wrote:

To the extent that liability is imposed for omissions (i.e., failure to detect and
correct dangerous conditions), such fear [ofprosecution] will affect a broad class
of employees, most of whom will never be prosecuted or even threatened with
prosecution. In addition, there is a cost to civil libertarian values, because
statutes that apply broadly can never be enforced evenly. Hence, some instances
of"targeting" or selective prosecutions (based on whatever criteria influence the
individual prosecutor) become predictable. These costs would be more tolerable
if the conduct involved were inherently blameworthy, but negligence, like death
and taxes, is inevitable.
Coffee, supranote 199, at 220. On the question of selective prosecutions in Good Samaritan
cases, Dressler noted that:

[O]mission criteria are far less helpful in determining whether and against whom
a prosecution should be initiated than are identifiable acts of commission. There
is a significant risk with [Good Samaritan] laws that the decision to prosecute
will be based on a prosecutor's perceived need to respond to public outrage ....
(which in turn, may be founded on inappropriate factors, such as race,
background, or even the physical attractiveness ofthe victim and/or the supposed
poor character of the bystander).
Dressier, supra note 184, at 984-85.
Concern about selective prosecution applies equally to reporting statutes. When an
assault victim is brought to an emergency room with injuries, the reporting statutes, if
triggered, will apply to every employee involved in the treatment of that victim. Which
employee will be prosecuted, ifany? Prosecutors have the ability to determine the criteria by
which they decide which employee to prosecute, thus setting the standards for liability.
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mandatory reporters by requiring them to report their suspicions to the
government - upon pain of prosecution for the failure to do so - when they might
reasonably have preferred to take a different course of action. At least in the case
of public welfare offenses, one might say, as has the Supreme Court,3" 2 that
corporate officers or employees who fail in their regulatory duties may properly be
faulted for having failed to prevent the harm to society. By entering into the
business of the corporation, those officers and employees understood they would
be held responsible to uphold those duties to ensure the safety of the public. With
reporting statutes, on the other hand, mandatory reporters cannot be faulted for
having caused the harm that the law aims to deter by their failure to report. They
enter the professions of medicine or banking, for example, with the intentions of
curing people and providing financial services to customers, respectively, but not
necessarily with the understanding that they would be required to serve as an arm
of law enforcement.30 3 The question is whether depriving them of this liberty
interest is morally acceptable as a means of achieving the goals of reporting laws.
The Supreme Court's decision in Lambert v. Californiashed some light on this
question.3" The appellant in Lambert was convicted for failing to register with
local law enforcement as was required by the Los Angeles Municipal Code of all
felons who resided in the city.3 5 In effect, the ordinance was a reporting statute:
It required this felon to volunteer information to the police that she - a person who
may pose a future threat (based on past criminality) - resided at a certain
residence. 3 6 The Court's opinion is recognized for articulating the fundamental
requirement of due process that a person's liberty cannot be denied without
providing fair notice of the duty imposed by law. 3 7 The Court contrasted the felon
registration ordinance that it struck down with various public welfare offenses that
it had upheld. It noted that public welfare offenses punish the failure to act only in
"circumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences of his deed,"" °
whereas "circumstances which might move one to inquire as to the necessity of
registration [by a felon] are completely lacking."3 "9 Although arguably in mere
dicta, the Court then seemed to engage in a balancing of costs and benefits of the
statute in determining whether the harm to the appellant's liberty interests were
' See supra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.

3

See supra text accompanying notes 20-21, 99.
355 U.S. 225 (1957).
Id. at 226-27.
See id. at 226.

"

The decision also is recognized for being as close as the Court has ever come to

303
30

constitutionalizing a mens rea requirement as a fundamental prerequisite to criminal
punishment. See Louis D. Bilionis, Process,the Constitution,and Substantive CriminalLaw,
96 MICH. L. REv. 1269, 1271 (1998).
3
Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228.
3
Id. at 229.
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outweighed by the government's interests in obtaining the information:
At most the ordinance is but a law enforcement technique designed for
the convenience of law enforcement agencies through which a list of the
names and addresses of felons then residing in a given community is
compiled. The disclosure is merely a compilation of former convictions
already publicly recorded .... Nevertheless, this appellant on first
becoming aware of her duty to register was given no opportunity to
comply with the law and avoid its penalty, even though her default was
entirely innocent." 0
Thus, the Court weighed the cost of a person for "wholly passive"' ' conduct
under circumstances in which the person cannot be faulted for not having acted
against the benefits of a law that provided information to the police merely as a
"convenience of law enforcement."3' 2
A balancing test makes sense both for purposes of evaluating the due process
question as well as for determining good public policy. In the case of reporting
statutes, reporters clearly provide information to law enforcement that might not
otherwise be available, and the information concerns suspicions of recent crimes
that may call for immediate governmental response. In contrast, the ordinance
requiring the registration of all felons at issue in Lambert only produced
information about the whereabouts of persons whose crimes had already been
adjudicated." 3 Thus, on the one hand, the value of the information provided by
mandatory reporters serves a purpose greater than a mere "convenience of law
enforcement." On the other hand, the value of this information should be weighed
against the infringement of the liberty interests of mandatory reporters and against
other costs associated with required reporting by professionals who traditionally
may have enjoyed confidential relationships with clients or patients.

IV. THE TRADE-OFFS OF REPORTING STATUTES:
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION VS. CONFIDENTIALITY IN
PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY

The development of wise public policy demands that policymakers consider
both the costs and the benefits of proposed statutes. In drafting the current
reporting statutes, it is clear that legislators considered many of the "costs" of
reporting statutes, such as the concern that reporters might be sued for negligence
310

Id.

312

Id. at 229.

3

See id. at 226.

Id. at 228.
I"
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in filing an erroneous report. Without exception, legislatures have granted
immunity from civil liability and usually from criminal liability as well. 3 4 The
effect on evidentiary privileges has been taken into account as well, with most
reporting laws abrogating most privileges. 3 " Thus, legislators have determined that
the value ofthe information gathered through mandatory reports outweighs the loss
of confidentiality between patients/clients and the professionals who serve them.
Without taking issue with decisions to abrogate some privileges and to impose
duties on certain professions, this Article submits that the purposes of reporting
statutes would be even better served - and the harm to professional relationships
minimized - by changing the evidentiary trigger from "reasonable cause" or
"suspicions" to "clear and convincing," or at a minimum "more likely than not."
Legislators eager to continue to encourage reporting may enact a rule making it
permissible - but not mandatory - to report on the basis of reasonable suspicions.
Criminal sanctions would only apply to cases in which clear and convincing
evidence exists. Civil immunity from lawsuits based on the act of reporting should
continue to apply broadly, both to permissive and mandatory reports, so as to
provide reporters with protection from retaliatory lawsuits.
As shown in Part III, a higher standard eases the dilemma of mandatory
reporters such as medical professionals, educators, lawyers, or bankers who may not
feel comfortable reporting mere suspicions, but may feel compelled to do so if the
law demands it when there is "reasonable cause" or "suspicious activity." A higher
evidentiary trigger also would reduce the number of lawsuits filed against reporters
(even though these are ultimately dismissed due to immunity protections). It would
be hard to bring a non-frivolous lawsuit against a reporter who had "clear and
convincing" evidence of criminality to report. A higher evidentiary trigger would
further require the filing of a report only in circumstances in which the failure to
report clearly would be considered a moral failing. In those cases, professionals
who are bound by rules of confidentiality may be pleased to have the freedom to
notify the authorities, as their consciences may dictate, if it would protect a
vulnerable client or patient. Finally, the liberty interests of professionals are shown
more respect by a standard that mandates that they report only if the evidence is
"clear and unequivocal." Legislators should show a modicum of restraint in
conscripting professionals to act on behalf of the government by limiting the cases
in which they must act to those that are more compelling.
Notwithstanding the fact that abrogating a professional privilege, arguably, may
be justified in some cases, the overall damage to professional relationships caused
by the enactment of reporting statutes should not be underestimated. The issue of
314 See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing civil and criminal immunity for
child abuse reporters).
315 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (discussing abrogation of privileges in
child abuse reporting).
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confidentiality arises mostly in the areas of child abuse, elder abuse, or domestic
violence, and situations in which health professionals, members of the clergy, and
in many states, lawyers, are obligated to report. These types of reporting laws
implicate the evidentiary privileges that may exist between mental health
professionals and patients, clergy and penitents, physicians and patients, and
lawyers and clients, as well as between spouses. 1 6 They also implicate the
confidentiality of a patient's medical records.
The threat posed by reporting statutes to mental health professionals is
particularly acute. InJaffee v. Redmond,317 the Supreme Court upheld the existence
of a psychotherapist-patient privilege under federal law, making the following
observations:
Like the spousal and attorney-client privileges, the psychotherapistpatient privilege is "rooted in the imperative need for confidence and
trust.".. . Effective psychotherapy... depends upon an atmosphere of
confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and
complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Because
of the sensitive nature of the problems for which individuals consult
psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential communications made
during counseling sessions may cause embarrassment or disgrace. For
this reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may impede development
of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment. 8
The Court's decision actually involved a social worker who was acting in her
capacity as a therapist. Thus, the privilege applies broadly to all types of mental
health providers. The Court noted that the benefits of successful treatment
obviously serve the private interests of the patient, but that "[t]he mental health of
our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public good of transcendent
importance" as well. 319 Both victims and abusers may be deterred from discussing
an abusive situation with mental health professionals - and getting the help they
can provide - unless they are assured complete confidentiality. Without the
assurance of confidentiality, it would be "difficult if not impossible" for mental
health professionals to provide successful treatment.320 Even a rule that requires
disclosure only in cases in which the abuse is clear and unequivocal does not

316

For a general discussion of evidentiary privileges, see 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses

§§ 285-556 (1992).
317 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
318 Id. at 10 (citation omitted).
319Id. at 11.
320 Id. at 10 (quoting the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee regarding the proposed
psychotherapist-patient privilege).
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eliminate the possibility that people may avoid getting help from mental health
professionals, but at least it reduces the overall amount of reporting and possibly the
deterrent side-effect as well.
Members of the clergy serve in a therapeutic counseling capacity as well. The
same arguments for preserving the confidentiality between mental health
professionals and their patients apply with equal force to the relationship of clergy
with members of their congregation who confide in them and seek counseling.
Moreover, laws that mandate the reporting of a person's confidences by members
of the clergy may infringe upon religious freedoms.3 2'
The recent scandals in the Roman Catholic Church do not necessarily confirm
the wisdom of mandatory reporting laws that abrogate the clergy-penitent
privilege.322 Rather, they reveal certain complications that arise when the "penitent"
is also a priest who is an employee of the clergy member (e.g., a bishop). In cases
in which a clergy member counsels a person who is not employed by the Church,
the clergy member has no legal obligation (absent a reporting duty) to act upon the
person's confession of past criminality."2 Like mental health professionals, the
clergy member would offer advice and guidance (not to mention forgiveness and the
imposition of a penance) with the intent of healing the person so as to prevent any
future criminal activity. Absent a reporting statute, clergy would have no legal
obligation to take any action in response to the revelation of criminal acts. A
Cardinal, however, as the head of an archdiocese, does have a legal obligation to
safeguard parishioners of the archdiocese from employees who are known to
present a danger. 24 Members of the American Catholic Church most likely would
have been satisfied if the leadership within the Church had found effective ways to
safeguard children from future abuse by priests who confessed to pedophilia even if they did not report the priests' crimes to the police. The problem is that they
appear to have failed miserably in their moral and legal obligation to protect the
See generally Keel, supra note 54, at 692 (arguing that mandatory reporting violates
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment).
322 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
323 An exception for statements of intent to commit future crimes or frauds applies to the
clergy-penitent privilege. Presumably, ifa priest expressed an intent to commit future crimes
against children, the evidentiary privilege would not exist. One difficulty in this area is that
pedophilia increasingly isconsidered long-term compulsive behavior that is not easily cured.
The concern that such behavior may in fact be a character trait led to the adoption of new
Federal Rules of Evidence 413-14, which freely admit evidence of child sexual assaults as
character evidence. See Sherry L. Scott, Comment, Fairnessto the Victim: FederalRules of
Evidence 413 and 414 Admit PropensityEviednce in Sexual Offender Trials, 35 HOus. L.
REv. 1729, 1745-47 (1999).
324 See, e.g., Michael Rezendes, Judge Accepts Geoghan Settlement, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 20, 2002, at A8 (Cardinal and archdiocese of Boston agree to $10 million settlement
of 84 lawsuits against defrocked priest and church officials).
32?
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children of their parishes.325 As a result, some have called for simply mandating
that they report all confessions of child abuse to the police.326 As with mental
health professionals, removing the protection of confidentiality between members
of the clergy and their penitents would have the unfortunate effect of deterring
people from disclosing their criminality and seeking spiritual guidance. Limiting
the reporting duty to clear and unequivocal cases at least minimizes the number of
cases in which clergy will be required to violate their relationships of trust with
penitents.
Similarly, attorneys have long enjoyed confidentiality in their legal
consultations with their clients. Indeed, the attorney-client privilege is "considered
indispensable to the lawyer's function as advocate on the theory that the advocate
can adequately prepare a case only if the client is free to disclose everything, bad
as well as good. 3 27 Requiring an attorney to disclose a client's admission regarding
illegality may well result in deterring clients from confiding with attorneys in the
first place. Thus, by abrogating the privilege and requiring attorneys to report their
clients, the law may simply reduce the overall number of incriminating statements
made to attorneys, and thereby reduce the ability lawyers might have to promote
lawful behavior.
Mosteller pointed out, however, that the argument for preserving the attorneyclient privilege in states that require child abuse reporting makes little sense unless
the psychotherapist-patient privilege is also preserved. The same arguments would
surely apply to elder abuse reporting as well. For one thing, "psychotherapists at
least have a treatment regimen that holds some hope for changing behavior [while]
[l]awyers by contrast cannot claim any special ability to induce legal behavior
through therapeutic conversation. 3 128 For another, he noted:

The folly of preferential treatment for attorneys may readily be seen by
imagining a scenario in which a lawyer has secured the confidential
admission of her client regarding past abuse. She wishes to advise the
client to seek treatment in hopes of preventing future abuse, but
understands that any other professional to whom the client is referred
will be required to report the prior conduct in disclosed during therapy.
In that situation, preserving the privilege for the lawyer alone has limited
See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Complaintson Boston PriestsDatedto '79, Documents Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2002, at A18 (describing how complaints about a priest molesting children
31

reached the Archdiocese of Boston in 1979, but the priest was not removed until 1991;
complaints of child abuse by the priest were made throughout 1980s).
326 See Budoff & Chedekel, supra note
2.
32

Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A HistoricalPerspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66

CAL L. REV. 1061, 1061-64, 1068-70 (1978), reprinted in YOUNGER, GOLDSMrrH, &
SONENSHEIN, PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE 786 (4th ed. 2000).
328

Mosteller, supra note 26, at 265.
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utility and little theoretical cogency.329
As the proliferation of state and federal reporting laws shows, legislatures do not
seem inclined to preserve the privilege for either group, at least as regards child and
elder abuse. The proposal to raise the evidentiary threshold that triggers the duty
to report at least strikes a better balance in protecting the competing interests of
protecting vulnerable groups, on the one hand and encouraging open dialogue
between victimizers or victims and the professionals who have-traditionally provided
confidential consultations, on the other.
In contrast to those who provide mental or spiritual guidance, physicians, nurses,
and other types of medical professionals may have a less compelling need for an
evidentiary privilege. The Supreme Court noted that "[t]reatment by a physician for
physical ailments can often proceed successfully on the basis of a physical
examination, objective information supplied by the patient, and the results of
diagnostic tests. '330 Therefore, the need for frank discussion of sensitive issues may
not be as important. However, though there may not be an evidentiary privilege that
precludes a doctor's testimony regarding a patient's statements, both the public and
the medical profession generally regard it as a rule that a patient's medical
"'
information should be kept confidential unless the patient consents to its release.33
Though physicians may be required to testify in court, they are otherwise under an
332
ethical duty not to reveal their patients' medical information.
The growing list of conditions that must be reported to the authorities bymedical
professionals threatens to make confidentiality the exception rather than the rule.
Commentators frequently voice the concern that the lack of confidentiality due to
mandatory reporting will deter people - both victims and abusers

treatment in the first place.333

-

from seeking

Mandatory reporting means that medical

Id. at 266.
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
311 See Robert M. Gellman, PrescribingPrivacy: The Uncertain Role of the Physician in
the Protectionof PatientPrivacy, 62 N.C. L. REV. 255, 257 (1984) (noting that a physician's
duty to keep patients' information confidential has been recognized "since time immemorial").
332 Id. at 267-68.
333 See, e.g., Brown-Cranstoun, supra note 31, at 629 n.97 (stating that domestic violence
victims may be deterred from seeking medical assistance); Daire, supra note 31, at 79
(observing that mandatory reporting can discourage battered women from seeking medical
care or from confiding in their physicians); Gellman, supra note 214, at 274 (arguing that,
without assurances of confidentiality, patients may refuse treatment or not seek treatment in
the future); McFarlane, supra note 31, at 23-24 (noting that spousal abusers may deny their
victims medical treatment, and victims who do not want the information reported at that time
forsafety reasons mayavoid medical treatment); Moskowitz, supra note 41, at 109 (stating that
opponents of elder abuse statutes fear mandatory reporting will deter elders from seeking
treatment). But see Jones, supra note 31, at 238-40 (arguing that battered women may not
329
330
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professionals will be required to take the initiative to disclose their patients'
information and to put in motion the legal process of investigation, resulting in
possible prosecution. As such, the impact on a patient's life is direct and
immediate, as compared to the distant possibility that a physician may be compelled
to testify at some later time in a legal matter initiated by someone other than the
physician. Again, in order to minimize the deterrent side-effect of reporting laws,
the law should limit the cases in which medical professionals are required to report
to those that involve clear and convincing criminal activity.
Another difference between the effect of the evidentiary trigger on medical
professionals as opposed to mental health professionals is that medical
professionals may be expected to file reports based on evaluations of a patient's
physical condition alone. If a patient has a gunshot wound, the duty to report is
clear to the medical professional. As discussed above, however, there may be
ambiguity in determining whether a child or elder is the victim of abuse or neglect.
A higher evidentiary trigger thus clarifies the duty to report, making the
professional's job easier. It also has the benefit of not deterring people from
seeking medical assistance when injuries are minor for fear that that the injured
person's condition may be misinterpreted by a physician as abuse when in fact it is
not.
Bankers, too, must ordinarily keep their client's financial information
confidential,"' but the disclosure of a client's financial dealings does not have the
same harmful side effects as such disclosures have in the medical or mental health
professions. People need banking services to secure their funds and to make them
easily transferable. With the exception of those individuals with smaller amounts
of money, most people will not be deterred from using banking services by the
threat of disclosure. Still, bankers and, after the adoption of the USA PATRIOT
Act, many other business people, should not be burdened with the duty to maintain
records and file reports whenever a customer engages in a "suspicious" activity.
The task of reporting the activities of their clients solely for the benefit of law
enforcement is a deprivation of their liberty that should be justified by a higher
evidentiary standard. Even a "probable cause" standard would better serve the ends
of preserving the liberty of bankers and other business people.
Professionals whose relationships ordinarily are not cloaked in confidentiality,
such as educators who are required to report child abuse or businesses that handle
hazardous wastes, would benefit from a higher evidentiary trigger as well.
Educators should be free to educate children without the burden of serving as police
informants, except in those cases in which a child clearly is being abused. Note that

know of their right to confidentiality, so they may not be deterred from seeking assistance
and that it is unlikely that the injured will shun physicians).
331See, e.g., Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000).
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the failure to report in cases of clear abuse should not be tolerated. 35
In the context of environmental legislation, Congress had the good sense to
require reporting only of "reportable" (i.e., substantial) amounts of hazardous
wastes as determined by the EPA. 336 The nature of environmental reporting is
different because polluters are required to self-report their own spills,337 so there is
no question that a spill has occurred. Still, the law recognizes that this burden
should not be imposed - and the failure criminalized - unless the spill is serious
enough to pose a threat to the environment.
CONCLUSION

No one would question the urgency of combating child or elder abuse, of
remedying hazardous waste spills, or of preventing the laundering of money by
terrorists or drug dealers. Legislators have sought to harness the resources of
people in positions to assist the government in fighting these serious social
problems by requiring them to report their suspicions upon threat of criminal
punishment. Alternatively, they might have chosen to offer financial incentives,338
or they might have developed other programs to promote greater awareness and
enlist voluntary cooperation.339 Instead, with respect to these particular problems,
legislators have chosen to use the coercive threat of criminal punishment.
The proliferation of reporting statutes calls upon scholars to incorporate them
into our understanding of criminal law theory. This Article has demonstrated that
reporting offenses share many common theoretical threads with Good Samaritan as
well as public welfare offenses. Yet reporting offenses represent a unique category
...See generally supra note 80 (addressing the failure ofprincipals to report teachers that
abuse students).
336 See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
317See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
338 See, e.g., Joan H. Krause, "Promisesto Keep ": Health CareProvidersand the Civil
False Claims Act, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 1363, 1367 (2002) (explaining how the federal
government fights health care fraud by permitting "whistleblowers" to file qui tam actions
that allow private parties who bring the actions to retain fifteen to thirty percent of proceeds
of suit). Besides assisting in law enforcement, the government can encourage good behavior
by its citizens through a variety of financial incentives. See Johnny Rex Buckles, The Case
for the Taxpaying Good Samaritan: Deducting Earmarked Transfers to Charity Under
FederalIncome Tax Law, Theory and Policy, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1243, 1320-25 (2002)
(arguing in favor of allowing taxpayers to earmark donations to charities to benefit a named
person). See generally Levmore, supra note 180, at 891 (addressing the most efficient mix
of rewards and penalties to encourage rescue by Good Samaritans).
339See, e.g., Clymer, supra note 6 (discussing the TIPS program proposed by the Justice
Department). The government might have funded educational programs, proposed model
protocols for detection of the problems they are trying to combat, and promoted voluntary
adoption of professional guidelines that call for reporting as well.
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that has grown sufficiently large so as to deserve attention in its own right.
The tendency to prefer reporting statutes as a means of enlisting assistance for
law enforcement in the detection of offenses also behooves us to question whether
these statutes have been drafted in a manner that best serves the compelling ends
legislatures intend. Many reporting statutes show little regard for the value of
confidential relationships between professionals and their patients or clients,
whereas traditionally the privacy of those relationships was considered sacrosanct.
Eliminating confidentiality in those relationships can have serious negative
consequences, some of which, ironically, undermine the very goals of the reporting
statutes. Moreover, reporting statutes represent an infringement on the liberty of
the people designated as reporters, and legislatures should have to fully justify any
deprivation of an individuals' liberty. As argued in the Article, one way to
maximize the benefits of reporting statutes while minimizing the harm to
traditionally confidential professional relationships is to raise the threshold for
imposing a reporting duty from "reasonable cause" or "suspicious activity" to "clear
and convincing," or, at a minimum, "more likely than not." Such a change would
not preclude a legislature from making the reporting of lesser suspicions permissive
rather than mandatory. Moreover, civil immunity for the act of reporting should
continue to apply broadly in order to shield reporters who might otherwise be
deterred by the fear of liability. A higher threshold shows greater respect for the
liberty interests of professionals in these fields as well. Finally, a higher threshold
also would make the enforcement of reporting statutes more practical, since it is
easier to prove that a physician failed to report a "clear and convincing" case of
child abuse than it is to prove that a doctor had "reasonable cause to believe" a child
had been abused and did not report it. More vigorous prosecution of reporting
statutes would have the effect of ensuring that serious cases would not go unnoticed
by the government agencies in a position to intervene.

